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ARTICLES
CEO RETENTION
Lee Harris*
Abstract
Again and again, economists, corporate law scholars, and Congress
have turned to reforms, such as executive compensation reforms, as a
solution to executive misbehavior. The root of the evil, they muse, is skyhigh pay with only a flimsy connection to managerial performance. If CEO
pay can only be rejiggered on the front end and tied to performance, the
argument goes, executives can be expected to pursue shareholder interests
and put aside egos, and firms will prosper. This Article argues that such
reforms are, despite the best of intention, fool’s gold. The fallacy is not in
thinking that CEOs and other executives who have abused their position
and have failed to live up to expectations should be paid less—they should.
However, this Article argues that when CEOs and other executives fail,
they should be out of a job altogether. This Article goes on to describe how
to create a right of retention by drawing the analogy to the public sphere.
Specifically, one way to check CEO conduct is through periodic up-ordown votes, the same kind of retention-style elections a plurality of states
use to give voters a say in whether judges should be ousted. Importantly, in
states that use them, retention elections have treaded lightly—they have
created a monitoring device to hold in check the worse abuses without
undermining the authority of public officials (governor and judicial
nominating committees) from making their selections about whom should
be appointed. Thus, I suggest that retention elections provide a useful path,
after bad conduct occurs, to checking corporate executive abuses.
Incidentally, as I have suggested in the past, this approach demonstrates
that, once again, a solution from the public sphere might mitigate another
long-standing problem in the private sphere—this time, CEO
accountability. Finally, this Article proposes a new classification scheme
for efforts to rein in CEO misbehavior and promote accountability. The
expected success of efforts to rein corporate leadership abuses depends,
crucially, on timing. Reforms have a higher chance of achieving their goals
if the focus is on actual (or past) performance, not anticipated performance.
Thus, this Article makes some initial claims about when to create
prospective incentives for good behavior versus retrospective punishments
for bad behavior.
* Federal Express Corporation Professor, University of Memphis Law School. J.D., Yale
Law School. The author is grateful for comments received at Duquesne University, Emory
University, and the University of Memphis. The author owes particular thanks to Michael
Abramowicz, Alena Allen, Jill Fisch, Ken Gormley, Michael Granne, and Jane Moriarty. Research
assistance was provided by Whitney Curtis, Richard Davey Douglas, and James Hicks.
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INTRODUCTION
Executives at major U.S. firms are paid too much,1 and their
1. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Are American CEOs Overpaid, and, if So, What if Anything
Should Be Done About It?, 58 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1041–42 (2009) (“Theory and evidence suggest that
there is indeed overcompensation of the CEOs of American publicly held corporations.”); Randall
S. Thomas, Explaining the International CEO Pay Gap: Board Capture or Market Driven?, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1171, 1183 (2004) (finding that American CEOs are paid significantly more than
CEOs in other countries). See generally Jeffrey N. Gordon, “Say on Pay”: Cautionary Notes on the
U.K. Experience and the Case for Shareholder Opt-In, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 323 (2009)
(noting that sky-high executive pay has generated headlines for at least the last fifty years). As an
absolute number, CEOs are paid astronomical sums. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 9 (2004)
(reporting that aggregate pay for top executives in a sample of 1500 companies totaled roughly
$100 billion); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency
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performance is often lousy.2 At the expense of the firm’s long-term health,
they train their sights on short-term goals, like stock price pops and other
clever tricks to monetize their stock options.3 The recklessness of firm
leaders caused the global financial system to collapse,4 and they will likely
do it again. This line of thinking has led to a raft of attempts by public
authorities to regulate the behavior of firm CEOs and other executives,
particularly through executive compensation proposals.5 Unfortunately,
these reform attempts have generally failed.6
Nonetheless, reformers continue to re-dip their chalices in the same
well. Despite previous flops, economists, corporate law scholars, and
Congress have turned repeatedly to reforms, such as executive
compensation reforms, as the solution to executive misbehavior.7
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSPS. 71, 88 (2003) (noting that CEO compensation was almost eight
percent of profits at many large public companies). Relative to other rank-and-file employees, chief
executives pay has skyrocketed in the last few decades. See William W. Bratton, The Academic
Tournament Over Executive Compensation, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1559 (2005) (reviewing
BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra) (noting that CEOs made thirty times the salary of an average production
worker in 1970 and 210 times the same worker in 1996). For a discussion of the elements of
executive compensation, see Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact
of Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 312–13 (2009); Randall S. Thomas &
Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1021, 1028–30 (1999). As mentioned, not everyone agrees. A small minority of observers
have argued that executive pay reforms only interfere with efficient market outcomes. See, e.g.,
John E. Core et al., Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH.
L. REV. 1142, 1142 (2005) (reviewing BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra) (noting that the belief of the need
to reform executive compensation is “widespread” and offering a counterargument to “an
increasingly one-sided debate); see also Jie Cai & Ralph A. Walkling, Shareholders’ Say on Pay:
Does It Create Value?, J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 299, 305–06 (summarizing the
“interference hypothesis”).
2. See generally Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation:
Focusing and Committing to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359, 359 (2009) (noting the claim
that typical executive compensation schemes led to “reckless conduct”).
3. See, e.g., id. at 363 (proposing that executive compensation focus on restricted stock
options that can be exercised two to four years after the executive departs in order to create
incentives for executives to focus on long-term goals); Posner, supra note 1, at 1026 (noting that
stock options create incentives to manipulate and take too much risk); Judith F. Samuelson & Lynn
A. Stout, Are Executives Paid Too Much?, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 26, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123561746955678771.html (arguing that part of the reason for the
economic failure is because executives were paid significant amounts to focus on “short-term
thinking”).
4. Posner, supra note 1, at 1027, 1040–41 (comparing CEO compensation practices to
factors causing the savings and loan crash of the 1980s and explaining the indirect connections
between the current recession and financial crises and executive compensation); Simmons, supra
note 1, at 306 (noting that “[l]awmakers often link executive compensation . . . to broader economic
turmoil, such as plant closings, unemployment, outsourcing domestic jobs, and income inequality”).
5. See Simmons, supra note 1, at 304 (noting various legislative attempts to rein in
executive compensation).
6. See infra Part I.
7. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 71 (noting that executive compensation reforms
are focused on helping to “alleviate the agency problem in publicly traded companies”); Thomas &

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2013], Art. 3

1756

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

According to these reformers, the problem begins with sky-high pay that is
barely connected to managerial performance.8 The argument is simple: if
CEO pay can only be adjusted on the front end and tied to performance,
executives can be expected to pursue shareholder interests, put aside egos,
and firms will prosper.9
When Governor Bill Clinton ran for the White House in 1991, his
campaign planted its flag on this theme.10 Once he took office in 1992,
President Clinton delivered. In fact, President Clinton ushered in one of the
biggest reforms to date to encourage firms to make a strong link between
CEO pay and performance.11 Specifically, Congress approved changes to
the tax code that created preferential tax treatment for firms that make
CEO (and other executives’) compensation a function of their
performance.12 Those changes to the tax code led to a sea change in how
companies compensate their executives (and later many of their
employees), with firms shifting to stock- and stock-option-based
compensation and away from fixed compensation.13
Judging by the levels of CEO pay today and the hand-wringing about
CEO performance, the Clinton-era reform attempt has failed miserably.14
Yet, policy makers and academics continue to turn to executive
compensation and related measures to monitor and police CEO conduct.15
Martin, supra note 1, at 1032 (discussing pay as a method of creating accountability according to
economists).
8. See, e.g., James E. Heard, Executive Compensation: Perspective of the Institutional
Investor, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 749, 751 (1995) (arguing that institutional investors are concerned
about the connection of pay to performance).
9. See, e.g., Bhagat & Romano, supra note 2, at 361 (summarizing an approach to executive
compensation reforms that will provide managers of publicly traded corporations with the proper
incentives).
10. See Ryan Miske, Note, Can’t Cap Corporate Greed: Unintended Consequences of Trying
to Control Executive Compensation Through the Tax Code, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1673, 1686 (2004)
(describing the campaign pledges of then-Governor Bill Clinton and his statement that “[i]t’s wrong
for executives to do what so many did in the 1980s. The biggest companies raised their [CEOs’] pay
by four times the percentage their workers’ pay went up and three times the percentage their profits
went up” (second alteration in original)).
11. David Leonhardt, Why Is This Man Smiling?; Executive Pay Drops off the Political
Radar, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/16/weekinreview/ideastrends-why-is-this-man-smiling-executive-pay-drops-off-the-political-radar.html (chronicling the
tax code changes ushered in by President Clinton and the disappearance of executive compensation
as a political hot-button issue).
12. See Simmons, supra note 1, at 303–04 (discussing President Bill Clinton’s promise to end
excessive executive compensation by using the tax code).
13. See Miske, supra note 10, at 1688–89 (reporting staggering growth in the use of stock
options after 1992 and the tax changes that year).
14. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 1, at 306 (suggesting that executive compensation reforms
have failed as judged by the marked increase in executive compensation levels).
15. See Posner, supra note 1, at 1045–46 (suggesting a slate of reforms including disclosure
and taxation).
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Just recently, Congress limited executive compensation at bailed out
firms.16 Next, as part of the Dodd-Frank Act—a behemoth financial
industry overhaul—Congress gave shareholders an advisory vote on
whether the CEO and other executives are paid too much, a so-called sayon-pay.
This Article makes several contributions. First, this Article argues that
these types of reforms are, despite their best intentions, fool’s gold. They
have done little to create any accountability among executives and there is
little reason to expect things to change. At their very best, reforms based on
executive compensation are a second-best solution to curb corporate
leadership abuses. The problem is not in thinking that CEOs and other
executives that have failed to live up to expectations should be paid less.
They should. More importantly, though, is that when CEOs and other
executives fail, they should be out of a job altogether. CEO leadership is
too important.17 Good CEOs promote the firm’s interests, manage and
inspire employees, make savvy product decisions, and lead the firm into
new markets.18 But bad leaders, if not held accountable, can harm the
firm’s interests, shirk responsibility, and entrench themselves away from
the glare of any oversight.19 Shareholders at public companies should have
a limited, but still effective, say-so in whether CEOs are retained, not how
well they may be compensated. This Article describes how to create a right
of retention by drawing the analogy to the public sphere.
Second, this Article demonstrates that giving shareholders a new right
to remove firm executives does not have to be drastic or clumsy. While I
argue for shareholder power to remove firm executives, the move in this
direction should be tactful and limited. After all, if shareholders are given
too broad a right to remove unwanted executives, the change in dynamics
would undermine one of the core tenants of corporate law—the
centralization of power in the hands of the board.20 Reform should not
16. Id. at 1014 (noting limits on salary for bailed-out firms).
17. See Mark R. Huson et al., Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A LongTerm Perspective, 56 J. FIN. 2265, 2266 (2001) (noting that the decision to bring in a new CEO is
one of the most important decisions of the board); Simmons, supra note 1, at 311 (noting the
attributes of a good executive leader).
18. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 762 (2002) (noting some of the key attributes of a
successful firm leader).
19. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 71–72 (noting several examples of managerial
misconduct).
20. See, e.g., Heard, supra note 8, at 749 (noting the benefits of centralized authority). For a
discussion of the pay-setting process and the board of directors’ role, see Thomas & Martin, supra
note 1, at 1025–28; see also Randall S. Thomas et al., Dodd-Frank’s Say on Pay: Will it Lead to a
Greater Role for Shareholders in Corporate Governance?, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1213, 1215–16
(2012) (discussing the view that enhancing shareholder voting power might undermine board
authority).
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careen the apple cart.21 As shall be shown, a perfect analogy from the
public sphere can guide corporate law in orchestrating this delicate pas de
deux—centralization of power in the hands of an authority while creating
real accountability.22
Specifically, this Article argues that one way to curb executive
misconduct is through periodic up-or-down votes, the same kind of
retention-style elections some states use to give voters a say in whether
judges should be ousted. In states that use them, retention elections have
treaded lightly—they have created a monitoring device to hold in check the
worst abuses without undermining the authority of public officials (the
governor and judicial nominating committee) in making their selections
about whom should be appointed. In states that have used retention
elections, voters do not have the power to choose judges.23 Importantly,
that power is reserved to special judicial nominating commissions, along
with approval of the governor. But when judges steer too far afield, voters
can remove them.24 Thus, this Article suggests that retention elections
provide a useful path, after bad conduct occurs, to check corporate
executive abuses. Incidentally, as I have suggested in previous work, this
approach demonstrates that, once again, a solution from the public sphere
might mitigate another long-standing problem in corporate law—this time,
CEO accountability.25
Third, this Article proposes a new theory for classifying and
understanding efforts to check CEO misbehavior and promote
accountability.26 Current reforms hinge on decisions revolving around CEO
21. See Robert B. Thompson & Paul H. Edelman, Corporate Voting, 62 VAND. L. REV. 129,
148 (2009) (noting the long-standing concern that reforms that empower shareholders would create
serious problems, including permitting the corporation “to take opportunistic advantage of other
stakeholders”).
22. See Michael R. Dimino, The Futile Quest for a System of Judicial “Merit” Selection, 67
ALB. L. REV. 803, 803–04 (2004) (describing retention elections as the “middle ground” in attempts
to balance independence and accountability); see also Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and
Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 625–27 (2009) (suggesting that the struggle in crafting judicial
selection is between the judicial independence model of appointment and the accountability model
of elections).
23. See Shepherd, supra note 22, at 637.
24. As a consequence, this Article also makes a contribution to the wide-ranging debate about
judicial selection. The debate on judicial selection has raged for decades, if not centuries. See, e.g.,
Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 973 (2001) (noting that
the subject of selecting judges is “now in its fourth century of debate in this country”).
25. See, e.g., Lee Harris, The Politics of Shareholder Voting, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1761, 1765–
66 (2011) [hereinafter Harris, Shareholder Voting] (arguing that shareholder voting dynamics can
be analogized to citizen voting in political elections); Lee Harris, Shareholder Campaign Funds: A
Campaign Subsidy Scheme for Corporate Elections, 58 UCLA L. REV. 167, 192 (2010) [hereinafter
Harris, Shareholder Campaign Funds] (arguing for a campaign subsidy system for shareholder
challengers along the same lines as campaign subsidy systems in presidential elections).
26. At least one scholar has made some earlier observations in this regard. In a previous
article, Minor Meyers makes note that one of the reasons some executive compensation reforms are
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compensation. These decisions, at bottom, are made before the CEO’s
performance can be observed, prior to CEO failures, and prior to any news
of misconduct.27 As shall be shown, the expected success of efforts to rein
corporate leadership abuses depends, crucially, on timing. Reforms have
more a chance of achieving their goals if the focus is on actual (or past)
performance, not anticipated performance. In other words, this Article
organizes previous reform measures in terms of timing. Thus, this Article
makes some claims about when to create prospective incentives for good
behavior versus retrospective punishments for bad behavior.
Part I summarizes government’s main attempts to check corporate
executive abuses, mainly by encouraging firms to tinker with their
executive compensation schemes in the hopes that the changes will
incentivize executives to perform well. Dodd-Frank, for instance, is one of
the most significant pieces of financial services reforms ever passed by
Congress.28 The overhaul gives shareholders advisory voting rights on
executive compensation schemes.29 Although the votes are nonbinding,
shareholders are entitled to vote on pay levels, how often executive
compensation schemes ought to be presented to shareholder voters, and socalled golden parachutes or exit compensation for executives.30 Part II
presents a counterproposal for holding CEOs accountable: CEO retention
elections. Retention elections are widely used in the public sphere to give
voters a chance to decide whether state judges can return to office.31 That
is, in many states, after a state nominating committee appoints a judge,
ineffective is because “it is impossible to know ex ante whether a new executive’s performance will
be so inadequate relative to her contractual entitlements that the payout . . . will later appear
outrageous.” Minor Myers, The Perils of Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, 36 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 417, 449 (2011).
27. See Posner, supra note 1, at 1024 (noting that a compensation package is a function of the
board’s appraisal of the CEO’s ability ex ante).
28. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., and 15 U.S.C.). DoddFrank made a number of changes to financial services regulation beyond creating shareholder
advisory votes on executive compensation. Dodd-Frank reforms several areas from derivative
transactions to CEO compensation. For instance, Dodd-Frank creates a strong and mandatory
clawback provision. Executive compensation is often tied to reported financial performance metrics.
As it turns out, these metrics are often wrong. Under Dodd-Frank’s clawback provision, firms
would be required to seek the return of excess executive compensation after a restatement. In
addition to reforms to executive compensation, Dodd-Frank includes reforms of how derivatives are
traded, among other topics. See Jesse Fried & Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, 36 J. CORP. L.
721, 731 n.47 (2011) (reporting that over 4,000 firms in recent years restated financial statements).
For a brief discussion of the various provisions of Dodd-Frank and the policy rationales for the
reforms, see generally BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41350, THE DODD-FRANK WALL
STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: ISSUES AND SUMMARY (2010).
29. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 951, 124 Stat. at 1899–
90.
30. See infra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
31. Abrahamson, supra note 24, at 976 (noting that the majority of state judges are elected).
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citizens may periodically vote on whether the judge should be retained.32
The same sort of system could be set for CEOs and other executives.
Finally, Parts III and IV discuss the practical and political advantages of
retention elections.
I. EX ANTE APPROACHES TO ACCOUNTABILITY
Imagine if one placed the current approaches to hold CEOs and other
high-ranking executives accountable for misconduct on a timeline. Marks
on the left side of the timeline would represent the various proposals by
legislators, endorsed by corporate observers, to hold CEOs accountable. As
illustrated below, such proposals primarily include ways to use CEO
compensation to drive better performance and rein in misconduct—tax
penalties for firms with CEO compensation packages not tied to
performance objectives; broad disclosure to shareholders regarding pay

Mandatory
Disclosure
Tax Reforms

CEO Misbehaves
Advisory Votes

packages; and advisory votes on how much the CEO should be paid.
At one end of the timeline, one might put a mark for instances of
managerial misconduct. If reform measures were visualized this way,
almost all of the previous reform proposals would be to do something
about CEO conduct before the misconduct occurs. For instance, tax code
changes might incentivize firms to reform their compensation practices
before any CEO misconduct has occurred and without an analysis of CEO
performance. Such reforms, which are discussed in detail in this Part,
might be said to be ex ante reforms, prior to CEO misconduct. Naturally,
this Part is followed by my proposal for an ex post reform, after CEO
misconduct.
A. Tax Code
As mentioned, the vast majority of reforms since at least the early
nineties can be understood as a crusade to create accountability by
toughening the links between pay and executive performance.33 If CEOs’
32. Shepherd, supra note 22, at 637.
33. See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 2, at 361 (noting the “well-developed and widely
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pay depends on their ability to enhance firm value, this will incent CEOs
and other executives to perform well and in the shareholder’s interest.34
Proponents of enhanced CEO accountability have argued that changes in
the tax code are a good way to spur firms to make their compensation
structures more performance based.35
Proponents of using the tax code to create more accountability in the
executive suite have focused on tax benefits, such as the deductibility of
wages.36 Normally, executive salaries, like wages and other employee
costs, are deductible business expenses.37 In order to hold CEOs and other
high-ranking executives accountable, reformers proposed capping the usual
deductibility associated with some executive salaries.38 They proposed
limiting deductibility with respect to fixed compensation.39 At the same
time, they proposed continuing to permit firms to deduct the cost of
executive salaries as long as such salaries qualified as “performance-based
compensation.”40 The thought was that, if used skillfully, limits on salary
deductibility would encourage firms to reform their executive
compensation schemes to make them more performance dependent. Firms
could be expected to shift from large fixed compensation schedules (not
deductible) to more performance-based alternatives, like stock and stockbased options (deductible).
Most famously, in 1993, Congress approved a flat $1 million tax
deductibility limit on CEO pay.41 Thus, firms paying executive salaries
accepted economics literature on the fashioning of incentives to achieve consonance between
managers’ actions and shareholders’ interest through the use of stock and stock-option
compensation”).
34. Id.
35. For instance, in 2004, Congress approved § 409A of the tax code, which threw cold water
on in-the-money (discounted) options. Under this provision, discounted options would be taxed
immediately and, more importantly, employees would pay a 20% penalty on those options. The
goal, of course, was to encourage firms to avoid this type of compensation since discounted options
obliterated the connection between pay and performance. See David I. Walker, Evolving Executive
Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal Contracting, 64 VAND. L. REV. 611, 626–27
(2011) (noting the tax implications of discounted options).
36. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (2012) (providing that “[t]here shall be allowed as a
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid . . . in carrying on any trade or business,
including (1) a reasonable allowance for salaries or other compensation for personal services
actually rendered”).
37. See, e.g., id.
38. See id. § 162(m)(1) (providing that “[i]n the case of any publicly held corporation, no
deduction shall be allowed . . . with respect to any covered employee to the extent that the amount
of such remuneration for the taxable year with respect to such employee exceeds $1,000,000”).
39. See id.
40. See id. § 162(m)(4)(C) (2012) (providing that the limits on deductibility “shall not
include any remuneration payable solely on account of the attainment of one or more performance
goals”).
41. This does not mean that all previous attempts to regulate CEO pay through congressional
action were unsuccessful or that 1992 was the first attempt at deductibility caps. As early as 1984,
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above this amount would not be able to deduct the costs related to this
expense.42 Importantly, as part of the same change, Congress made
performance pay in the form of stock options entirely deductible.43 These
tax changes only applied to top executives—the firm CEOs and the other
four highest paid employees.44
In some sense, tax code changes were a stunning success. The response
from firms was partially as predicted. As a consequence of these changes,
firms began to rely less on fixed compensation that was unrelated to
performance measures.45 Firms adjusted CEO pay to make incentive
compensation appear to be an increasingly substantial part of overall CEO
compensation.46 These changes have contributed to relatively significant
growth in CEO compensation. In 1992, average CEO compensation, with
the value of options granted added, was $3 million.47 By 2005, average
CEO compensation more than doubled to over $7 million.48
On the other hand, some have argued that tax code changes have failed
in their principal objectives of creating accountability.49 For one thing,
savvy firm executives might easily outmaneuver the shift to stock-based
compensation changes, effectively eviscerating any connection to
performance. Professor Lucian Bebchuk and Professor Jessie Fried, two of
reformers in Congress attempted to rein in high pay to departing executives—so-called golden
parachutes—by tweaking the deductibility of these payments. David I. Walker, The Challenge of
Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 452–53 (2010) (noting that
the rules on golden parachutes may have been ineffective). For a discussion of these tax code
changes, see Miske, supra note 10, at 1676–84. Further, there were several unsuccessful attempts at
using the tax code to create more accountability for executive action. In 1991, Congressman Sabo
proposed taking away tax benefits for executive pay levels that were more than twenty-five times
that of the lowest paid worker. See H.R. 3056, 102d Cong. (1991). A year later, Senator Harkin
proposed taking away tax benefits for firms paying more than $500,000. See S. 2329, 102d Cong.
(1992). Both of these attempts were unsuccessful.
42. See Bratton, supra note 1, at 1562 (noting the growth in top executive compensation over
the last few decades, the lion’s share of which was in the form of incentive pay).
43. See I.R.C. § 162(m)(4)(G).
44. See id. § 162(m)(3) (defining covered employees).
45. See Miske, supra note 10, at 1688–89 (reporting that between 1992 and 2000 stock
options went from 27% of compensation to over 50%).
46. See Bhagat & Romano, supra note 2, at 365 (noting that equity incentive compensation
mushroomed after congressional action to limit deductibility of fixed cash compensation).
47. Posner, supra note 1, at 1021.
48. Id. at 1022; see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 18, at 753 n.1 (noting the rapid rise in
CEO compensation with the advent of stock options). The numbers for S&P 500 companies soared
at an even more staggering clip. See Bratton, supra note 1, at 1562 (reporting that top executive
compensation grew to $9.4 million by 2002).
49. The changes also failed in slowing the rate of pay increases. According to many at the
time, the issue was one of fundamental fairness and the hope was that chief executives would earn
less as a result of the changes. See Miske, supra note 10, at 1686 (noting the Senate Finance
Committee reported that “excessive compensation will be reduced [by the $1 million cap]”
(alteration in original)).
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the most widely known critics of this trend, have argued that firms have
been able to skillfully use changes to compensation design to ratchet up
their compensation schemes without any serious corresponding
enhancement to accountability.50 For instance, they argued that most
option-reliant compensation schemes overly reward the CEO for increases
in the markets generally or a particular industry—increases that are
unconnected to the CEO’s performance.51 Further, even when performance
has been poor, the CEO and other leaders might convince the firm to
reprice options—that is, set a new, lower exercise price.52
Finally, executive incentives based on stock and stock options might
actually undermine firm value by, among other things, promoting
disclosure manipulation and excessive risk taking.53 In an effort to raise
their firms’ stock prices and to monetize their option compensation, firm
leaders might be incentivized to strategically release information about
their firms’ well-being.54 Managers may have incentives to hide or
manipulate financial information reported to the public. This kind of
strategic release might run the gamut from opportune disclosure of
information all the way to outright fraud.55
Others have noted that, at the expense of the firms’ long-term health,
overreliance on stock options have incented CEOs (and other option
recipients) to engage in shenanigans to create stock price pops and other
risky gimmicks that might give them quick access to their stock options.56
Options provide virtually unlimited upside if stock prices rise. However,
there is limited consequence if the strategy fails to lift stock prices, since
the CEO does not bear any additional loss for the downside, other than the
loss of the options. Thus, firm leaders might take imprudent risks because
50. See, e.g., Bebchuk et al., supra note 18, at 757 (noting that firms fail to use option
schemes that “filter out stock price rises that are . . . unrelated to the managers’ performance”).
51. Bratton, supra note 1, at 1564 (noting that market and industry movements account for a
significant share of stock rise and “a payoff [for the CEO] is virtually guaranteed”); see also
Bebchuk et al., supra note 18, at 796 (mentioning a couple of ways firms might handle undeserved
windfalls, including indexing and vesting schedules).
52. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 127 (illustrating the issue of lowering executive
targets with an example from Coca-Cola); Bebchuk et al., supra note 18, at 759–60, 821–24
(discussing how option repricing undermines ex post incentives to perform well); Posner, supra
note 1, at 1027–28 (discussing repricing).
53. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 72, 88 (arguing that poorly designed pay structures
of managers dilute incentives and hurt corporate performance).
54. Id. at 89 (noting that managers may have incentives to hide or manipulate financial
information reported to the public).
55. See Miske, supra note 10, at 1690–91 (arguing that stock options incent executives to
“adjust accounting methods” and take other manipulative actions to lift stock prices in the short
term and access their compensation).
56. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 1, at 1026 (noting that stock options create “an incentive to
manipulate the stock price, and there is evidence that this incentive has been responsible for a
number of financial debacles”).
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of the prospect of stock and stock options. They hope to revel in the
upside, which is virtually unlimited, but are ensconced in the safety that
their downside exposure is limited to the value of the options.57 For
instance, in a previous paper, Professor Bebchuk suggested that inaptly
designed compensation structures can create incentives for managers to
make acquisitions that add little to firm value.58 They may pursue a path of
so-called empire building since they expect that helming a larger firm will
ultimately lead to higher pay, regardless of the firm’s performance.59
It is important to note that relying on the tax code to create
accountability in the executive suite attempts to incent good behavior
beforehand, or ex ante—that is, prior to any specific misconduct on the
part of executives at firms. Board decisions to change pay structures are at
bottom tax driven, rather than based on the performance of their
executives. In order to take advantage of tax benefits, boards of directors
would remake their compensation structure, shifting from a fixed-salary
structure to one more reliant on option-based compensation. Before CEO
performance is observed, the tax changes drive boards of directors to
rework their pay structures. At some firms, the new incentives might be
warranted. At others, they may lead to sky-high pay with little connection
to actual performance.
B. Mandatory Disclosure
In addition to tax code changes, reformers have argued that broadening
the required disclosures that firms make to shareholders can drive
accountability in the executive suite.60 Broad disclosures, such as
disclosures regarding CEO pay, alone would not directly rein in potential
CEO misconduct. Rather, broad disclosure might help shareholders and
other observers learn information and make more informed decisions. For
instance, the media might report on broad disclosures regarding CEO pay,
which, when unmeritorious or extravagant, might stir public outrage.61 In
short, reformers hope that disclosure will help actuate external monitors
(mainly, media) and internal ones (here, shareholders) to take action to

57. Id. at 1026–27 (noting that stock-option compensation creates “no ceiling on the potential
gain, but the loss is truncated at the value of the options”).
58. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 89.
59. See generally Thompson & Edelman, supra note 21, at 147 (noting the ever-present allure
of empire building).
60. See Heard, supra note 8, at 752; see also BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 192–94
(advocating for broader disclosure and improved transparency). For a brief discussion of the history
of disclosure requirements, see Simmons, supra note 1, at 342–43; see also Thomas & Martin,
supra note 1, at 1040–43. For a review of the latest set of disclosures as approved by the SEC, see
Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, 71 Fed. Reg. 53,158 (Sept. 8, 2006) (to be
codified at scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.).
61. See infra note 250 (briefly describing the role of media as monitor).
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hold CEOs accountable.62
However, some evidence suggests that shareholders see little value in
additional firm disclosures. According to a recent paper by Professor
Randall Thomas, Professor James Cotter, and Professor Alan Palmiter,
disclosure-type proposals have generated little support from shareholders.63
Their paper found that shareholder proposals related to disclosure and
additional reporting obligations were rare.64 Further, in the rare instances
when such proposals were put to shareholders for a vote, they received
extremely low levels of support, frequently in the single digits.65 In fact, in
the Thomas, Palmiter, and Cotter eight-year study, no shareholder
proposals related to disclosure were approved.66 The authors speculated
that the findings were relatively unsurprising, since shareholders already
have sufficient information.67
Ironically enough, broadening disclosures may actually exacerbate the
difficulty of holding CEOs accountable for their performance. While this
information may be of little value to shareholders, broad disclosures do
give CEOs and other firm leaders a glimpse into the pay at other firms,
information that might have run-up CEO pay disconnected from
performance.68 As firms made more information publicly (and easily)
available, the various disclosures created benchmarks.69 Managers are able
to use the released information to lobby boards of directors to increase
their compensation. The dissemination of the information begets a vicious
cycle, where firms set pay rates based on what other firms are doing, not
strictly on performance and incentives.70 Thus, another potential problem is
that broad disclosures may have had the perverse effect of possibly
62. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 75–76 (suggesting that disclosure might be an
effective tool to tamp sky-high pay).
63. See Thomas et al., supra note 20, at 1238 (reporting support of approximately 10% or
less).
64. Id. (noting that over the eight-year study period, “proposals—asking boards to compile
reports on executive pay, [or] to make additional disclosures about executive pay . . . were relatively
few in number and attracted low levels of average voting support (often less than 10% of votes
cast)”).
65. Id.; see also Thomas & Martin, supra note 1, at 1061 (reporting that disclosure proposals
are less successful than other types of proposals).
66. See Thomas et al., supra note 20, at 1238.
67. Id. at 1239 (explaining that “shareholders already receive voluminous disclosures about
the levels and composition of pay for the top five executives at public companies and so they do not
see the need for more information or reports from the company”).
68. Bratton, supra note 1, at 1579 (discussing the “ratchet effect” of pay as firms gauge their
success by reference to the pay of top executives at other firms).
69. Walker, supra note 41, at 454 (“[F]uller disclosure of pay appeared to lead more often to
pay increases than decreases, as low-pay firms sought to bring pay levels up at least to the average
of the relevant peer group.”).
70. See generally Posner, supra note 1, at 1024 (noting the board’s desire to pay CEOs at a
level commiserate to the seventy-fifth percentile of comparable firms).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

13

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2013], Art. 3

1766

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

increasing undeserved CEO pay.
Recall that the previously discussed tax code changes create ex ante
incentive effects for the board to take early and premature action, prior to
any observed conduct on the part of executives. Like tax code changes,
broad disclosures can also be described as an ex ante accountability tool.
However, in contrast to tax code changes, which call on boards to hold
executives accountable, disclosure reforms work their “magic” on
shareholders and external observers, such as the media. Both shareholders
and external groups play an important monitoring role in the structure of
the firm.71 Shareholders have important monitoring tools—namely, the
right to vote (for directors, among other important votes), inspect the
books, and sue—and thus, an established place in corporate governance.72
Meanwhile, the press reports on firm performance and instances of
misconduct, which can have a real effect on other actors. The issue,
nonetheless, is whether disclosure reforms actually enhance firms’ current
abilities to hold executives accountable.
On the one hand, broad disclosure reforms incentivize shareholders to
take action in holding executives accountable, but on the other, structure
accountability prior to observing actual conduct. In most cases of
disclosure of CEO compensation, for instance, prior to any observable
misconduct, shareholders would be given information about levels of pay.
As a matter of timing, disclosure requirements are usually made part of
periodic reporting, such as delivery of the firm’s annual proxy statement,
and are not obviously connected to performance. In short, disclosures may
drive accountability indirectly, as shareholders and other stakeholders
fulminate about the information as they learn it; however, this information
will likely be routinized and digested prior to any actual misconduct.
C. Advisory Voting
Recently, reformers have turned to shareholder advisory voting, socalled say-on-pay, to create more accountability in the executive suite.73
Advisory voting reforms give shareholders a chance to vote on top
executive pay levels. Even though the vote is typically nonbinding on the
firm, the thinking is that these votes will give shareholders a new conduit
for registering their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the performance of
top executives.74
71. LEE HARRIS, MASTERING CORPORATIONS 179–201 (2009) (describing the rights of
shareholders in firm governance).
72. Id. (describing the right to vote, inspect the books, and sue).
73. See, e.g., Cai & Walkling, supra note 1, at 304 (explaining the legislative gap filled by
“say-on-pay” reforms); see also BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 197–98 (advocating for more
voting rights, including binding votes).
74. But see Randall S. Thomas & James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New
Millennium: Shareholder Support, Board Response, and Market Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 368,
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Enchantment with advisory voting as a cure-all for managerial
performance issues probably began abroad and migrated to the United
States.75 The United Kingdom has required advisory voting for
shareholders since 2003.76 Other countries, like Australia and the
Netherlands, began to require firms to hold advisory votes on top executive
pay in 2004.77 In the United States, advisory voting began on a companyby-company basis. Beginning as early as 2006, shareholders began offering
proposals at annual firm meetings to amend the bylaws to permit
shareholder advisory votes.78 Relatively high levels of shareholders voted
to give shareholders say-on-pay. For instance, Thomas, Palmiter, and
Cotter find that shareholder votes on whether shareholders should have a
say on compensation receive broad support and are frequently approved by
shareholders.79 In fact, the topic of advisory voting eventually became the
most oft-sponsored subject of shareholder proposals.80
In 2009, Congress responded. Congress mandated advisory votes for
shareholders at firms receiving bailout funds under the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP).81 A few months later, proponents of advisory
voting secured a watershed victory with the financial services reform
known as “Dodd-Frank.” Dodd-Frank required all public companies to
give shareholders periodic advisory votes on top executives pay levels.82 In
particular, Dodd-Frank provides that shareholders are entitled to an
advisory (or nonbinding)83 vote on the levels of executive compensation for
376 (2007) (noting that in only 28.38% of cases did the incumbent board take action after a
majority-supported shareholder proposal).
75. Thomas et al., supra note 20, at 1233 (noting that one of the goals of advisory voting is to
“create a stronger relationship between ‘pay and performance’ and reduce the incidence of ‘pay for
failure’”).
76. Id. at 1217.
77. Id. at 1227.
78. Id. at 1217. Of course, shareholder proposals related to advisory votes on pay to
executives was only one type of shareholder proposals during this period. For instance, shareholders
also made proposals that covered topics like disclosure of compensation and hard limits on the
levels of executive compensation. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 1, at 1073 (noting several
categories of shareholder pay proposals). For an example of the language of shareholder proposals
regarding advisory voting, see Thomas et al., supra note 20, at 1219.
79. See Thomas et al., supra note 20, at 1238, 1240–42 (noting that “approve proposals” and
shareholder-sponsored say-on-pay proposals received consistently high levels of support across the
eight-year study period).
80. Id. at 1244.
81. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 5221(e) (2006) (providing that TARP recipients “shall permit a
separate shareholder vote to approve the compensation of executives”); see also Thomas et al.,
supra note 20, at 1218.
82. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); see also WEBEL, supra note 28,
at 3–21 (discussing various provisions of Dodd-Frank reforms).
83. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951(c) (“The
shareholder vote . . . shall not be binding on the issuer or the board of directors of an issuer, and
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high-ranking employees.84 In addition, Dodd-Frank provides that firms
shall give shareholders a chance to vote on the frequency of say-on-pay
votes. These “frequency votes” give shareholders a chance to say how
often they want to have advisory votes—for instance, once every six
months, once a year, or perhaps even less frequently. Third, Dodd-Frank
requires firms to give shareholders an advisory vote on CEO exit
compensation—golden parachutes, in certain circumstances. In the past,
corporate executives were able to make tremendous sums from the firm as
they made their exit.85 These new advisory votes would be required
beginning in 2011 for larger companies and 2013 for smaller ones.86
Supporters of the Dodd-Frank reforms argue the advisory votes are
likely to incentivize managers to create pay packages that align manager
and shareholder interests.87 For instance, though the say-on-pay votes are
nonbinding, the idea is that any significant level of no-votes will generate
negative media attention, which may persuade directors into realigning
their compensation schemes. Dodd-Frank will also have a second effect.
Because of say-on-pay, firms will tend to scale back CEO pay on the front
end because firms will be hesitant to propose large pay scales they will
have to circulate to shareholders. In short, the point of Dodd-Frank (not to
mention previous attempts at reforms like it) appears to be to tamp down
too high and unwarranted CEO compensation, preserve firm resources, and
improve firm value for shareholders.
Dodd-Frank’s approach to advisory voting attempts to strike a balance
between accountability and centralization. As to accountability, the votes,
though not binding on the board of directors, are concrete evidence of
shareholder dissatisfaction with firm leaders’ performance. Even before
Dodd-Frank, nonbinding voting was considered by several reformers as a
way to hold corporate leaders accountable. For instance, Joseph Grundfest
may not be construed—(1) as overruling a decision by such issuer or board of directors; (2) to
create or imply any change to the fiduciary duties of such issuer or board of directors; [or] (3) to
create or imply any additional fiduciary duties for such issuer or board of directors . . . .”);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14A(c) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (2012))
(providing that the vote “shall not be binding on the issuer or the board of directors”).
84. The SEC provides an example of the type of language firms should use. “RESOLVED,
that the compensation paid to the company’s named executive officers, as disclosed pursuant to
Item 402 of Regulation S–K, including the Compensation Discussion and Analysis, compensation
tables and narrative discussion is hereby APPROVED.” See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–21a (2013).
85. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 134 (noting that severance payments were often
as large as three years salary).
86. Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation,
76 Fed. Reg. 22 (Feb. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240, 249); Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951; see also Thomas et al., supra note 20, at 1218;
Securities Exchange Act § 14A(b).
87. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J.
247, 276–77 (2010) (noting that shareholder advisory votes might reduce excessive, undeserved
compensation arrangements).
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famously argued that shareholders dissatisfied with the firm performance
should “withhold” their vote for directors up for reelection.88 Although
these withhold campaigns would not be binding on the firm, Grundfest
conjectured that the votes would express dissatisfaction and lead to
changes in corporate governance.89
Additionally, since the votes are not binding on the boards of directors,
they do not directly damage the principle of centralization of power. Even
after an advisory vote expressing disfavor with the compensation schedule,
the board of directors can modify compensation levels or ignore the vote
altogether or even increase CEO compensation.90 Predictably, the fact that
boards of directors can ignore votes has been an easy target of critics.91
Perhaps as a consequence, the hopes for advisory voting were high.
Proponents of advisory votes suggested that the new law would, among
other things, “limit excessive risk taking,”92 and “compel corporate boards
to align pay with the corporation’s financial performance.”93 According to
one Treasury official at the time, advisory voting would “empower[]
shareholders with the ability to have stronger oversight.”94 In fact some
empirical evidence tended to bear out this optimism. For instance,
Professor Jie Cai and Dr. Ralph Walkling found some positive market
reaction as Congress made legislative progress on creating advisory votes
for shareholders.95 They reported that the market viewed positively the
prospect of advisory voting at some firms—firms with signs of excessively
high CEO compensation and poor corporate governance structures,
namely.96
However, other evidence suggests that the cold reality is that advisory
votes, like tax changes and disclosure reforms, turn out to be more a
tempting mirage than oasis.97 It should be noted at the outset that the
evidence is hardly conclusive at this point, since Dodd-Frank’s advisory
voting scheme has not quite reached all firms. Nevertheless, the evidence
88. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with
Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 857, 865 (1993); see also Thomas & Martin, supra
note 1, at 1053 (noting the symbolic success of “Just Vote No” campaigns).
89. Grundfest, supra note 88, at 866 (explaining that “vote no” campaigns might send a
signal to management that shareholders are unhappy with the firm’s performance). But see Cai &
Walkling, supra note 1, at 306 (noting the general theory that there is little market impact from
purely symbolic voting).
90. See Thomas et al., supra note 20, at 1220 (noting that boards, for a time, ignored
shareholder proposals on advisory votes).
91. See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 1, at 345 (arguing that say-on-pay may be feckless since
the vote is nonbinding).
92. Thomas et al., supra note 20, at 1236.
93. Id. at 1235.
94. Id. at 1236.
95. See Cai & Walkling, supra note 1, at 314 (reporting positive market reaction).
96. Id. at 314, 324 (finding that say-on-pay creates some firm value).
97. See text accompanying notes 99–107.
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so far indicates that shareholders rarely use advisory votes as a conduit for
oversight. The evidence suggests that once shareholders actually get their
say-on-pay, in the vast majority of cases, shareholders defer to
management, approving whatever pay package management puts in front
of them.
For instance, though there has been little research on firms under the
recently approved Dodd-Frank mandate, there has been some research on
the firms receiving TARP funds, since they were required to have their
advisory voting much earlier. At these firms, the current reported findings
are that shareholders approve management-recommended payment
schemes in an overwhelming majority of cases.98 For instance, Thomas,
Palmiter, and Cotter found approval in 88.7% of their sampled cases.99
They rightly noted that result surprising, since firm performance at those
firms holding advisory votes was likely poor.100 The sampled firms were,
after all, firms that had been forced to ask for TARP bailout funds.101 Yet,
Thomas, Palmiter and Cotter found that when called to vote on pay
packages, shareholder support frequently tops ninety percent and these pay
packages were rarely rejected.102 In explaining their findings, the authors
concluded that shareholders appear “not too concerned about overall pay
levels.”103
Similarly, studies of the United Kingdom experience show that
advisory voting has not necessarily led shareholders to take an active role
in firm governance. According to Gordon, shareholders in the United
Kingdom have approved virtually every pay package, only voting down
pay packages in eight cases over roughly six years.104 Gordon also noted
that the advisory votes have not stopped the rate of pay increase.105 Thus,
as it turns out, advisory voting may not create the kind of oversight
proponents had hoped for. Regardless of firm performance, in the vast
majority of cases, shareholders have unceremoniously approved CEO
compensation schedules. These preliminary findings make sense, as
98. Pay packages are recommended by management and, in most cases, are endorsed by
advisory firms, such as ISS. See, e.g., Thomas et al., supra note 20, at 1244 (reporting that ISS
endorsed 77.2% of management pay proposals).
99. Thomas et al., supra note 20, at 1224.
100. Id. (noting that the results were “interesting given that most mandatory say-on-pay votes
in 2010 were held largely at financial firms receiving TARP money”).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1243 (noting that shareholder support for proposals asking for approval of executive
pay packages “is extremely high—around 90% for 2008, 2009 and 2010—and only a small
handful—three in 2010—did not receive majority support by shareholders”); see also Cai &
Walkling, supra note 1, at 306 (explaining that advisory voting might have little impact since the
voting is purely symbolic).
103. Id. at 1239.
104. See Gordon, supra note 1, at 341.
105. Id. at 324 (noting the increasing gap between pay for top executives and average line
workers over the last five decades).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss6/3

18

Harris: CEO Retention

2013]

CEO RETENTION

1771

shareholders have weak incentives to spend time digesting and
understanding executive compensation decisions.106 For one thing,
shareholders frequently have small stakes in individual firms and a fully
diversified portfolio. For another, executive compensation plans typically
only represent a small share of total firm spending. As such, how the CEO
is paid will only affect shareholders’ portfolios indirectly—and then only
in a very small, almost imperceptible way.
Based on this early track record, there is little reason to be optimistic
about Dodd-Frank as an accountability tool. In fact, some corporate law
scholars, such as Thomas, Palmiter, and Cotter, have already begun to
speculate that after Dodd-Frank, advisory votes are likely only to affirm
management pay practices.107 Thus, Dodd-Frank is not likely to empower
shareholders, much less precipitate a shareholder revolt. In fact, one might
argue that advisory voting has actually created less oversight for managers.
For instance, one corporate law observer recently suggested that the
advisory votes merely provide cover for managers with compensation
packages that are undeserved and would otherwise be subject to
criticism.108 Managers can point to the vote results as evidence that their
compensation package must be fair and that their job performance is,
according to the vote, satisfactory. If not for advisory voting, some would
argue that given lackluster performance, managers would have a tough
time justifying pay packages to external watchdogs such as the media.
As to timing, advisory voting is similar to other reforms, particularly
disclosure reforms. With advisory voting, shareholders make a prediction
about how they expect the CEO to perform.109 If the shareholders expect
the CEO to do well, they might be happy to “approve” a lavish
compensation package. If the shareholders expect the CEO to do poorly,
they might vote the opposite. Either way, shareholders are making a
reasonable guess about something that they previously had no opportunity
to observe: the CEO’s performance at the relevant firm.110 Since
shareholders have not directly observed the CEO’s performance, it is
106. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 1, at 1034 (noting that shareholders have little
incentive to invest time to understand compensation plans).
107. See Thomas et al., supra note 20, at 1244 (concluding that, based on the evidence of
shareholder votes prior to Dodd-Frank, “we would project that management-sponsored say on pay
after Dodd[-]Frank would be likely to attract high levels of shareholder support and that only a
relatively small fraction of such proposals would likely fail to attract majority support”).
108. Minor Myers, The Perils of Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, 36 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 417, 436 (2011) (criticizing say-on-pay reforms by arguing that they diffuse responsibility
for pay packages and insulate directors); id. (“While shareholders cannot be held responsible for
initiating the compensation package, their approval can absorb some portion of future criticism.
This potential consequence of shareholder voting on executive compensation has gone unnoticed.”).
109. Id. at 422 (noting that advisory voting asks shareholders “to vote on—and legitimize—a
compensation scheme before they can know whether it is outrageous in relation to the executive’s
future performance”).
110. See id. at 449–50 (discussing timing of the say-on-pay vote).
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difficult to evaluate whether the CEO is worth the compensation
package.111 Moreover, in contrast to previously mentioned reforms, one
might also expect a relatively high and costly error rate associated with
advisory voting. Shareholders will approve high compensation packages
based on an expected performance that never pans out. They might also
erroneously reject low compensation packages when the CEO’s actual
performance turns out to be stellar.112 Thus, as a reform, advisory voting
may be mistimed and costly—this approach to reform gets shareholders
involved too early, before CEOs have actually performed.
II. AN EX POST APPROACH TO ACCOUNTABILITY
For years, scholars and regulators have argued about whether
government should get involved in managerial failures; once involved,
how government should respond to managerial failures; and, having
responded, whether government reforms worked.113 Based on the available
evidence, previous attempts at holding executives accountable have
generally failed.114 One of the problems of previous reforms is largely in
the mode of thinking. Previous reformers focused almost exclusively on ex
ante checks on managerial misconduct: tax code changes that incentivize
firms to create performance-based compensation plans; disclosure of
compensation plans in hopes of empowering shareholders; advisory voting
that gives shareholders a chance to express their opinion in matters of
compensation. All of these reforms have at least one feature in common:
They each seek to create accountability before the actual misconduct
occurs. Put another way, previous reforms focused on creating incentives
for good conduct, before any managerial conduct could be actually
observed.
However, as shown, these types of reforms have generally failed. For
instance, one of the problems with executive compensation is that it often
111. Id. at 449 (noting that shareholders are not in a position to “determine what constitutes
‘good compensation’ before the CEO has completed her term of service”).
112. This might be costly, since the CEO might leave the firm.
113. On a theoretical level, according to some observers, executive compensation reforms have
also failed. A general theoretical critique of these reforms made by some scholars is that the
government should not be in the business of regulating executive compensation at all. In this view,
executives at firms are not overpaid. Rather, their pay is a function of market forces. See Myers,
supra note 108, at 424 (reviewing literature suggesting that “rising pay for CEOs and other
executives is simply a function of the growing demand for their services”); Simmons, supra note 1,
at 306 (suggesting that executive compensation reforms have failed as judged by the marked
increase in executive compensation levels); Walker, supra note 41, at 439 (“The bottom line is that
regulating the term of executive pay is no less challenging than regulating the amount and may not
be worth undertaking.”).
114. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 189 (noting that their research aims “to improve
understanding of the problems that have plagued executive compensation” and arguing that “the
problems of executive compensation can be fully addressed only by adopting reforms that would
confront boards with a different set of incentives and constraints”).
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gives managers profound incentives to pursue short-term gains, such as a
pop in the stock price, even though such gains may be fleeting or even
detrimental to the firm’s long-term health. What is stunning is that despite
the failures of the current reform menu, current corporate scholars continue
to propose more of the same. In response, scholars have not suggested that
policy makers try shifting away from regulating executive compensation as
the main strategy. Unimaginatively, instead they have suggested more finetuning to executive compensation reforms.115 Thus, while well-intentioned,
the previous set of reforms all relied on creating prospective incentives for
managers to perform well, in particular through executive compensation.
This Part attempts to shift the mode of thinking relating to reform and
managerial accountability and, further, proposes erecting ex post
accountability for managerial conduct. An ex post approach to
accountability would focus on punitive responses to bad conduct after it
occurs. That is, ex post reform would focus on how a punitive retrospective
reform is better suited to manage managerial accountability. It is largely a
question of timing. For instance, consider the illustration below.
Mandatory
Disclosure
Tax Reforms

CEO Misbehaves
Advisory Votes

Retention Election

The dividing line between ex ante and ex post approaches to
accountability is CEO behavior. Ex ante approaches to accountability are
activated before CEOs can demonstrate their capacity to lead. Ex post
approaches to accountability empower stakeholders to do something after
the CEO has performed and failed. Thus, ex ante reforms are hopeful; they
imagine and hope for good conduct going forward, and they rely on the
firepower of theoretical incentives. But ex post reforms are realistic; they
exact punishment for bad conduct when it happens, and are based on
observed conduct. Thus, this Article proposes a retrospective approach to
drive managerial accountability. Specifically, periodic retention votes for
115. For instance, no less than the eminent Roberta Romano of Yale and Richard Posner of the
Seventh Circuit have proposed recently that regulation of executive compensation should attempt to
create incentives to pursue long-term firm value objectives, versus short-termism. See Bhagat &
Romano, supra note 2, at 359 (proposing that long-term incentives will create executive
accountability); Posner, supra note 1, at 1045–46 (suggesting a slate of reforms like broad
disclosure and tax code changes).
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CEOs (and other high-ranking executives) are one ex post approach to
creating managerial accountability. Retention votes are used in the public
sphere all the time.
For example, in the public sphere, state court judges are frequently
subject to an up–down vote by citizens. In a similar way, retention
elections could be utilized in the private sphere. CEOs (and other highranking executives) would be subject to periodic up–down retention votes.
Shareholders might get a say on whether these managers are retained.
Importantly, also, retention elections have limits on the role of stakeholders
in holding their agents accountable. Shareholders would not get a chance in
deciding who ultimately is to become the executive officer. In fact,
shareholders’ opinion about CEO salary (say-on-pay) may become moot.
This approach to accountability is comparable to how judicial elections in
many states operate. In these states, the public does not have the initial sayso on who is appointed to the bench, nor, of course, their salary. Most
judges are initially appointed, some through a nomination committee,
much like the nomination committee that operates at many public
companies.116 But judges are subject to periodic retention elections. Thus,
through retention elections, the selection process for executives would not
change. Similarly, CEOs and other high-ranking executive officers would
continue to be appointed by the board of directors.
A. Retention in the Public Sphere
An ex post approach to corporate accountability might be based on the
approach many states have turned to for holding judges accountable:
judicial retention elections. In the judicial setting, these retention elections
have managed to balance two potentially competing objectives—giving
citizens a chance to hold nonelected judges accountable, while protecting
the independence of judges.117
1. Judicial Retention Votes
With at least eighteen states utilizing them, judicial retention elections
are already the most popular method of imposing accountability on the
judiciary.118 However, judicial retention elections are only one of several
116. Joseph A. Colquitt, Rethinking Judicial Nominating Commissions: Independence,
Accountability, and Public Support, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 73, 73 (2007) (noting that “most
judges, even those in states utilizing judicial elections, initially take the bench through
appointment”).
117. See Laura Denvir Stith & Jeremy Root, The Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan: The Least
Political Method of Selecting High Quality Judges, 74 MO. L. REV. 711, 717 (2009) (noting that in
retention elections held for judges, accountability and judicial independence go hand in hand).
118. See Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical
Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 79 (2011)
(noting widespread adoption of retention elections). In fact, some version of retention elections may
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options states have utilized to select judges, including partisan elections
and nonpartisan elections.119 In partisan elections, judges run for office in
much the same way as candidates for any other political office. They raise
money, they run campaign commercials, and the major political parties
endorse and help procure a victory. As seen in the chart below, eight states
use partisan elections to select their judges.
State Supreme Court Selection by Retention
State
Alaska

Length of
Probationary
Term (if any)
3 years

Length of
Full
Term
10 years

Citation
ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 6.

Arizona

At least 2 years

6 years

Methods of Judicial Selections:
Arizona, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y,
http://www.judicialselection.us/jud
icial_selection/methods/selection_
of_judges.cfm%20?state=AZ (last
visited Oct. 16, 2013).

California

Up to 4 years

12 years

CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9083 (West
2013).

10 years

Methods of Judicial Selections:
Colorado, AM. JUDICATURE
SOC’Y,
www.judicialselection.us/judicial_
selection/methods/selection_of_jud
ges.cfm?state=CO (last visited Oct.
16, 2013).

Colorado

At least 2 years

Florida

At least 1 year

6 years

Illinois
Indiana

N/A
2 years

10 years
10 years

Methods of Judicial Selections:
Florida, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y,
http://www.judicialselection.us/jud
icial_selection/methods/selection_
of_judges.cfm?state=FL (last
visited Oct. 16, 2013).
ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 10.
IND. CONST. art. VII, § 11.

be becoming more popular as states turn away from partisan elections. Id. at 127–28 (noting a
movement toward retention elections in Nevada).
119. For a brief and accessible discussion of the main judicial selection methods and their
historical origins, see Rachel Paine Caufield, In the Wake of White: How States are Responding to
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White and How Judicial Elections Are Changing, 38 AKRON L.
REV. 625, 626–29 (2005) (discussing the tension between the values of democratic accountability
and judicial independence).
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Iowa
Kansas
Maryland

1 year
1 year
1 year

8 years
6 years
10 years

IOWA CODE § 46.16 (2013).
KAN. CONST. art. III, § 5 (c).
MD. CONST. art. IV § 5A(c).

Missouri

1–3 years

12 years

MO. CONST. art. V, § 19; MO.
CONST. art. V, § 25(C)(1).

Nebraska

3 years

6 years

NEB. CONST. art. V, § 21 (3).

New Mexico

Remainder of
unexpired term

8 years

N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 33.

Oklahoma

1 year

6 years

OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B, § 5.

Pennsylvania

N/A

10 years

PA. CONST. art. V, § 15.

South Dakota

3 years

8 years

S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7.

Tennessee

Until the next
general election
at least 30 days
after vacancy
occurs

8 years

Utah

3 years

10 years

Wyoming

At least 1 year

8 years

[Vol. 65

Methods of Judicial Selections:
Tennessee, AM. JUDICATURE
SOC’Y,
http://www.judicialselection.us/jud
icial_selection/methods/selection_
of_judges.cfm?state=TN (last
visited Oct. 16 2013).
UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 9.
Methods of Judicial Selections:
Wyoming, AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judi
cial_selection/index.cfm?state=WY
(last visited Oct. 16, 2013).

If the goal is to strike a good balance between accountability and
judicial independence, partisan elections creates uneven results. On the one
hand, partisan elections are compelling in terms of accountability. The
upside of partisan elections for judicial officers, after all, is that judges are
held accountable by popular will.120 On the other hand, partisan elections
for judges do a poor job of creating a basis for judicial independence. In
partisan judicial elections, political parties, interest groups, and donors
have an outsized influence on the electoral process, which could
undermine judicial independence.121
120. See William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, What Twenty Years of Judicial Retention
Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 341 (1987) (discussing the influence of progressives
and their interest in expanding voting rights in order to increase the accountability of public
officials).
121. Id. at 341 (noting that reformers sought to change judicial selection method in order to
“break the grip of the political machines on judicial selection”). But see Kang & Shepherd, supra
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For instance, Professor Michael S. Kang and Professor Joanna M.
Shepherd recently conducted an empirical analysis of the influence of
campaign contributions on judicial decisions.122 They reported that judges
selected in partisan elections (as opposed to judicial selection through
nonpartisan elections or retention elections) are more likely to support
business interests in their decision making.123 By contrast, the authors
reported that judges that face retention election show no obvious bias in
favor of business interests. In fact, the authors suggested that judges
selected through the retention method are as independent as judges with
lifetime tenure.124 In short, in a job that calls for impartial justice, judges
selected through methods such as partisan elections may be biased to
support the causes of those who supported their candidacy for office.125
As a consequence, some states have introduced nonpartisan judicial
elections. In these elections, judges also end up running for office, like
other candidates. However, in an effort to remove the overly political
nature of these elections, judges do not run under the banner of a political
party. Thus, judicial candidates in nonpartisan elections are less likely to
make the kind of campaign promises, receive benefits from parties and
party loyalists, and, importantly, owe favors once the election is over.
Nonpartisan elections remove some of the taint of ordinary politics from
judicial elections and restore at least the prospect of judicial
independence.126
However, nonpartisan judicial elections might do some damage in
terms of accountability. An advantage of partisan elections is that they
create opportunities for voters to have a say in judicial selection. If voters
have little information about prospective judicial candidates, then their
voting is under-informed or, worse, random. Party identification, or party
label, is shorthand that helps citizens sort through candidates and make a
(somewhat) informed selection. Thus, in nonpartisan elections, one could
argue that voters are less likely to make informed decisions. Without the
party label, voters may make decisions on the basis of things that are
note 118, at 73–74, 120 n.186 (noting the potential benefits associated with partisan judicial
selection methods).
122. See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 118, at 69 (testing the influence of campaign donations
on judicial decision making).
123. See id. at 73 (“Campaign contributions from business groups are associated at statistically
significant levels with judicial decisions for business interests only under partisan elections, but not
under nonpartisan ones.”).
124. Id. at 102 (reporting that “judges facing retention elections do not systematically vote
differently from judges facing gubernatorial or legislative reappointment and judges with permanent
tenure”).
125. See id. (reporting that campaign contributions influence judicial decision making).
126. See Stith & Root, supra note 117, at 721 (noting, for instance, the outsized influence of
political parties on elections in Missouri at the turn of the twentieth century). But see Dimino, supra
note 22, at 805 (noting the importance of party label for informed voting).
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irrelevant. As seen in the table above, thirteen states use nonpartisan
elections to select judges.
With these defects in mind, states began turning to judicial retention
elections in 1940, beginning in Missouri.127 In 1940, the state, through
popular initiative, instituted a plan to select judges under what was called a
“merit system.”128 By the 1960s, a significant number of states had adopted
retention elections similar to Missouri’s.129 The merit system would
usually have two important component parts.130 The first part of the
Missouri plan called for a judicial nominating commission to vet
candidates for the judiciary and narrow the pool.131 Once this was done, the
governor would appoint a candidate from the pool.132
The second part of the plan gave voters a chance to vote on whether to
retain the judge selected by the governor and nominating commission. In
some states, these retention votes would take place soon after the initial
appointment, as in a probationary vote, and much later, after the judicial
officeholder had served a full term.133 Voters would not get information
about party affiliation and judges would not run against other candidates.
Voters would simply be asked to vote on whether the incumbent judge
should continue in office. The hope of reformers was that voters would
cast their ballot based on the judges’ record in office.134 Thus, poorly
performing judges would be ousted in retention elections. If a judge was
ousted in a retention election, the judicial nominating commission would
reconvene and appoint a replacement to the bench.135 As mentioned, a
plurality of states relies on judicial retention elections.136 In the states that
have them, judicial retention elections seem to strike a good balance
between the twin goals of judicial independence and public
127. For a detailed history of judicial elections, see generally Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation
of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 190 (1993) (explaining judicial elections beginning in 1832).
128. See Stith & Root, supra note 117, at 712.
129. See Hall & Aspin, supra note 120, at 340 (noting that judicial retention elections were
used sparingly until the 1960s and 1970s).
130. See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 118, at 78 (discussing the Missouri plan).
131. See Hall & Aspin, supra note 120, at 341 (describing briefly the work of judicial
nominating commissions).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Stith & Root, supra note 117, at 725 (noting probationary votes in Missouri).
134. See Hall & Aspin, supra note 120, at 341 (noting that since judges run unopposed, voters
would cast their ballots based “only on the record compiled [by the incumbent while] in office”).
135. Id. at 341.
136. See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 118, at 79 (reporting that eighteen states rely on
retention elections; fourteen states use nonpartisan elections; nine states appoint judges; six states
use partisan elections; and three states give judges lifetime tenure); see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick,
The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 MO. L. REV. 675, 678 (2009) (noting that merit selection, which
usually features a retention vote, is “the most prevalent system of judicial selection in use in the
United States today”).
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accountability.137
2. Independence
To begin with, one of the chief advantages of judicial retention
elections is that they protect the independence of judges. The importance
of judicial independence is straightforward enough. Judges should be free
from public pressure that would make it hard to make tough, potentially
unpopular decisions. Judges should feel emboldened to resist the will of
the majority and protect the minority. Judicial independence can mean a
great deal in the annals of history. Regarding the school desegregation
trend beginning in the 1960s, one commentator has gone so far as to posit
that judicial independence meant that judges were free to resist “racist
threats and public hatred to integrate public schools.”138
Retention elections appear to sustain judicial independence.
Significantly, in those states that utilize judicial retention elections, judges
generally run unopposed, do not raise money, and only face retention
elections infrequently.139 Because judicial retention elections do not have
the usual features of a campaign, judicial candidates, once retained, owe
few favors.140 The U.S. Supreme Court held that judges who have to
campaign for office can give off the sense of bias in favor of those who
supported them.141 However, with judicial retention elections, judges seem
free from any whiff of bias in favor of those who supported them during
the campaign.142 Recent empirical evidence backs up these claims. In her
study on how judicial decision making, Professor Shepherd reported
virtually no evidence that judges who run in retention elections are biased
in favor of political interest groups.143 This is in contrast to stronger
137. See Hall & Aspin, supra note 120, at 342 (noting the often conflicting goals of judicial
independence and democratic accountability and the advent of judicial retention elections).
138. Shepherd, supra note 22, at 625.
139. See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 118, at 94 (noting that judges in retention elections are
prohibited from campaigning); see also James J. Alfini & Terrence J. Brooks, Ethical Constraints
on Judicial Election Campaigns: A Review and Critique of Canon 7, 77 KY. L.J. 671, 684 (1989)
(noting the prohibition against campaigns in unopposed races, like retention elections).
140. See Stith & Root, supra note 117, at 736 (noting that in Missouri, retention elections
sidestep partisan politics).
141. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 870 (2009) (observing that judicial
independence is compromised “when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or
directing the judge’s election campaign”); see also N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552
U.S. 196, 212 (2008) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that partisan judicial elections raise the
question of “whether that process is consistent with the perception and the reality of judicial
independence”).
142. See Stith & Root, supra note 117, at 740 (discussing the perception of bias associated
with large campaign donations); see also Shepherd, supra note 22, at 680–81 (reporting that the
absence of campaign donations in judicial retention elections removes bias).
143. See Shepherd, supra note 22, at 681 (noting that the “empirical results show that retention
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findings by the same author that judges might bias their decision making
following partisan elections.144
Also, since judicial candidates have little reason to build a campaign
apparatus, successful judicial candidates have little incentive to ingratiate
themselves to donors, political parties, interest groups, and others who
might support campaigns in hopes of winning future elections. Recall that
in the Kang and Shepherd study, the researchers concluded that partisan
elections do a poor job of keeping judges independent.145 In order to
preserve independence, the authors recommended nonpartisan and
retention elections since these elections do not rely on the usual features of
campaigning.
Furthermore, judicial retention elections only occur infrequently. As a
consequence, judges are not always making decisions weighed by the
prospect of an intervening (and potentially career-ending) vote by the
public.146 For instance, in Missouri, the first state to adopt retention
elections, Missouri Supreme Court justices face retention votes every
twelve years.147 In states that use them, the minimum is six years. The
infrequency of the elections insulates judges from the risk of distraction
associated with the prospect of removal.148 Judges are empowered to make
decisions free from excessive worry about future voter whimsy.149 Thus,
judicial retention elections seem specially suited to preserve the ability of
judges to make decisions, even unpopular ones.
Finally, retention elections allow judges to maintain independence,
since judicial officeholders can almost always expect to return to office. In
fact, one researcher found that in retention elections, judge candidates are
returned to office nearly ninety-nine percent of the time.150 Another
suggests that in fifty years of these elections around the country, only
around fifty trial court judges have ever been ousted in retention

politics have almost no influence on the voting of judges under merit plan systems”).
144. Id. at 662 (concluding that “to keep their jobs, judges in partisan election systems must
appeal more to their retention agents than judges under other systems”).
145. See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 118, at 73 (reporting judicial bias in partisan elections).
146. See generally Abrahamson, supra note 24, at 981 (defining judicial independence as,
partly, the ability to make decisions free from fear of interference from citizens).
147. See Stith & Root, supra note 117, at 726 n.70 (noting the length of terms for retention
votes).
148. See Shepherd, supra note 22, at 634 (noting that long judicial terms are meant to “reduce
any dangers of excessive popular influence”).
149. See Stith & Root, supra note 117, at 744 (arguing that a benefit of lengthy terms for a
judge is avoiding “voter caprice”).
150. Hall & Aspin, supra note 120, at 343. By contrast, in partisan contested elections, judges
are more often turned out, sometimes regularly turned out. See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 22, at
628 (noting that in more recent partisan elections incumbents lost approximately 45% of the time);
Stith & Root, supra note 117, at 722 (noting that only twice were Supreme Court justices returned
to office in Missouri in the two decades between 1920 and 1940).
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elections.151 One author found that judges in retention elections received
on average about 77.2% of the vote to retain.152 The infrequency of ouster
is likely intentional in light of the historical perspective. It represents
another of the many design features that states used to ensure that judges
would be independent from the whims of voters.153 The infrequency of
ouster staves off regular upheaval in the judiciary and makes some level of
consistency possible.154
3. Accountability
As mentioned, almost never has a judge been thrown out in a retention
election. But the fact that few judges are recalled during a retention
election is not necessarily a failure of accountability. For one thing, a low
turnover rate could be a sign that nominating commissions are selecting
high-quality judicial candidates, which would preclude any reason to turn
out judges.155 Regardless, retention votes still give constituents a voice in
monitoring their elected officials. For instance, though judges are almost
always returned to office, the cases where judges are not returned to office
are particularly salient to court observers and are widely covered by the
media.156 Judges, one would expect, will want to avoid such a public
embarrassment.157 Thus, the presence of voting, even if voters seldom oust
the officeholder, represents a credible monitoring function.158
151. See Hall & Aspin, supra note 120, at 342.
152. Id. at 343 (discussing vote percentages to retain and defeat judges across 1,864 trial judge
elections).
153. See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 118, at 78 (pointing out various historical features of
judicial elections designed to maintain judicial independence).
154. See Stith & Root, supra note 117, at 725 (noting the value of consistency in the
judiciary).
155. See id. at 745 (noting that judicial commissions select high-quality candidates and the
vote merely confirms the wisdom of those choices).
156. See id. at 744 nn.141–42 (noting two examples of state supreme court judges losing
retention elections); see also Abrahamson, supra note 24, at 986–87 (discussing the ouster of
Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White over her decision in a death penalty case, State v.
Odom); Shepherd, supra note 22, at 625 (calling the ouster of California Supreme Court Justice
Rose Bird over her decision in a death penalty case and other similar incidents “[t]ragedies”).
157. See Kang & Shepherd, supra note 118, at 94 (noting empirical analyses that show that the
prospect of elections, any kind of elections, incent judges to avoid unpopular decisions); Nelson,
supra note 127, at 224 (noting that elections “keep judges honest once they reach[] the bench”).
158. See Stith & Root, supra note 117, at 744 (arguing that retention elections serve as a final
backstop and make it clear that “the people are in charge”). Incidentally, also, retention votes seem
especially suited for informed voting, an important feature of accountability. Turnout in judicial
retention elections is lower than for other electoral contests. See Hall & Aspin, supra note 120, at
342 (noting the low turnout rates). The lower turnout is usually associated with more informed
voting, as uninformed voters are more likely to avoid voting, particularly on down-ballot races.
Also, because judges run unopposed in retention elections, it means that judges need not worry too
much about uninformed voting for a seriously unqualified candidate, a possibility that exists only
when there is an alternative on the ballot. Furthermore, it is likely that the design features of
retention elections help voters focus on substantive criteria when they cast their vote. In judicial
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B. Retention in the Private Sphere
In the same way voters in many states get a retention vote on state
judges, shareholders might be given an up–down vote on whether the CEO
and perhaps other high-level executives are retained.
1. CEO Retention Votes
There is a range of options for implementing retention votes at public
companies. For instance, retention votes might be modeled on early
advisory voting reforms—that is, shareholder-sponsored proposals on a
company-by-company basis. Before Dodd-Frank, shareholders at targeted
firms submitted proposals to amend firm bylaws and create advisory votes.
In some of these cases, these shareholder proposals were approved by a
majority vote of shareholders and became part of the targeted corporation’s
corporate governance structure.
In a similar way, shareholders might propose a periodic shareholder
vote on whether the CEO should be returned to office.159 Shareholder
proposals are virtually costless to their proponent, since corporations are
required to disseminate shareholder proposals on the proponent’s behalf.160
Proposals are typically nonbinding on the corporation.161 Thus, if
shareholders in a retention vote approve an ouster, the board might be
expected, but is not obligated, to follow shareholder wishes.162 The
shareholder-proposal approach to creating retention elections can be
characterized as a “soft” regulatory approach. Firms are reformed, if at all,
on a case-by-case basis after a shareholder–proponent pitches a proposal
regarding retention votes and the proposal is approved by a majority of
shareholders. Reform is piecemeal. Not all firms would be affected at once.
The advantage of this approach is that reform can be specifically tailored to
the needs of each firm. Firms can also learn from one another. Early
adopters of the reform would serve as models for firms that adopt the
retention elections, judicial candidates are typically prohibited from campaigning. In this way,
voters likely make up their mind whether the judge has performed satisfactorily, not on the basis of
whether the judge has a sufficient number of campaign commercials, or other irrelevant variables.
159. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2012) (describing the procedure to make a shareholder
proposal).
160. See Harris, Shareholder Voting, supra note 25, at 1770 (discussing shareholder proposals
and noting that “[s]hareholders . . . can piggyback the firm’s proxy statement at virtually no cost to
the shareholder and present a proposal to the other members of the shareholder community”).
161. One of the core features of the firm is the centralization of authority. As a consequence,
shareholders are forbidden from introducing proposals that undermine the board’s authority. Thus,
securities regulations have been interpreted to only permit shareholder proposals that are advisory
or nonbinding. See Stephen Choi, Proxy Issue Proposals: Impact of the 1992 SEC Proxy Reforms,
16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 233, 241 (2000) (reporting study results that show that shareholder proposals
were almost always advisory).
162. See Thomas & Cotter, supra note 74, at 379 (reporting that the board took action with
respect to advisory proposals in only twenty-five percent of sampled cases).
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reform later. Later adopters might modify and improve the earlier models.
However, broad reform might be a long, tedious slog, as reformers submit
proposals to corporations one by one.163
Alternatively, corporations could be required by law to hold retention
votes. This style of reform would be similar to the approach of Dodd-Frank
on advisory voting, which, as mentioned, requires that all public
companies hold advisory votes on compensation schemes.164 This style of
reform, where reform is required by law and broadly applicable, might be
referred to as a “hard” regulatory approach. In contrast to the shareholder
proposal approach, arguably the most important advantage of this
regulatory approach is that the reform would apply to all corporations at
once. On the other hand, a disadvantage of a Dodd-Frank-style approach to
retention elections is that this approach eliminates opportunities to learn
and make adjustments. Shareholder proposals can be analogized to a pilot
program wherein, through successive iterations at one firm at a time,
reformers might get a chance to observe what works and make changes.
Also, hard regulatory reform would require intervention from lawmakers,
which creates the potential for unpredictable outcomes and depends on the
reform’s political appeal. A soft approach, by contrast, does not depend
completely on the political appeal of the reform, since any shareholder may
make a proposal to adopt retention elections at any corporation in any
given year.165
2. Independence
One advantage of retention elections for firms is that this reform would
not unduly undermine the ability of directors and executives to make
decisions and take risks. Corporate law scholars agree that business leaders
should be independent of influences that would chill decision making.166
Recall that in the judicial sphere, independence means that judges should
be free to resist the will of the majority in the interests of justice.167
163. Further, it is uncertain whether shareholders at each firm would approve these proposals,
which might require proponents to return a second year, extending their slog.
164. See Thomas et al., supra note 20, at 1218.
165. However, a disadvantage of a case-by-case approach is that the process of selecting the
individual cases may be co-opted by special interest groups. This could lead to misidentification of
potential targets for reform. Consider, for instance, case-by-case targeting with respect to
shareholder-sponsored proposals regarding say-on-pay. The firms that ended up being targets,
according to one study, were not necessarily the firms that would benefit from reforms—e.g., firms
that had excessive pay structures or weak corporate governance reforms. Instead, the firms that
ended up being targeted were simply large, high-profile firms. See Cai & Walkling, supra note 1, at
329 (reporting that the “primary factor driving the decision to target these firms appears to be their
large size” and noting that labor unions were frequent sponsors of proposals on say-on-pay); id.
(reporting a negative market reaction to proposals sponsored by labor unions regarding say-on-pay).
166. HARRIS, supra note 71, at 129–32 (describing the powers of the board of directors).
167. See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 22, at 625 (noting that it is an “assumed truth” that judges
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Corporate leaders should be able to lead into new markets, make changes
in personnel, and devote time to refining their product without undue
second-guessing. Freedom to take risks and make tough decisions is one of
the keystones of centralized authority and the core rationale for the
corporate form in the first place.
On the face of the matter, if implemented, retention votes would
represent an important new power to shareholders.168 Importantly,
however, retention elections would not significantly damage corporate
leaders’ ability to make tough decisions. In fact, retention votes would be
generally consistent with the emphasis on the board’s central authority. By
comparison, in judicial retention elections, voters do not get to select who
is appointed to the bench—only who stays. Recall that, like in the
corporate sphere, in many jurisdictions a central authority selects judges.
The judicial nomination commission (along with the state governor) retains
that power. Similarly, retention elections for firm executives would
continue to rely heavily on the board of directors. The board of directors
would continue to select the firm’s CEO and other high-ranking
executives, as is currently the case. When it comes to the selection process,
the status quo would be preserved. Significantly, also, in the event that the
CEO or other executive is ousted in a retention election, the board of
directors would select their replacement.
A related potential criticism of retention elections is that they take the
power to remove a CEO away from the board of directors. As power is
stripped from the board of directors, it undermines centralized
management, one of the core tenants of corporate law.169 However,
according to recent analyses, the board rarely uses this power.170 Currently
CEOs (and likely other high-ranking officials) retain their office for
significant periods of time, even in the face of middling performance.171 In
one recent study, researchers found that just over two percent (2.25%) of
CEOs are terminated in a given year.172 Thus, nearly ninety-eight percent
should be protected from public influence).
168. See Thomas et al., supra note 20, at 1228–29 (discussing the view that enhancing
shareholder voting power might undermine board authority).
169. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 121–122 (West 2013) (providing the general and
specific powers of the board); id. § 141(a) (providing that “[t]he business and affairs of every
corporation . . . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors”); MODEL BUS.
CORP. ACT § 8.01(b) (2012) (providing that power resides with the board of directors).
170. See generally Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and TopManagement Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 240 (1990) (reporting sample results that show that
CEOs hold their jobs for over ten years, on average, and that most leave at retirement age).
However, the trend may be changing slightly. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 18, at 773 (discussing
findings that outside-director dominated boards are more apt to terminate a CEO).
171. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 1, at 1022 (noting that there is greater CEO turnover in
Europe than at U.S. firms).
172. Dirk Jenter & Fadi Kanaan, CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation 1, tbl.1
(Aug. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Stanford University), available at

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss6/3

32

Harris: CEO Retention

2013]

CEO RETENTION

1785

of CEOs are retained. According to other research, average CEO tenure is
between six and seven years.173 Also, there is no reason board action
should operate as the exclusive method for removing a CEO. The power of
removal would simply be shared. In other words, shareholders might
remove a lackluster CEO, but so might the board of directors. Thus,
executive retention elections would continue to preserve the power of the
board of directors to make executive appointments and thus reaffirms the
importance of the board’s authority and the notion of centralized authority.
Furthermore, retention votes, if implemented, would preserve the
authority of executives to make tough decisions. Again, consider the
analogy to judicial retention elections. In the public sphere, voters have the
power to oust underperforming judges. However, they rarely do it. In the
vast majority of cases, judges can expect to return to office.174 One might
expect the same thing to be true of CEO retention elections. One would
expect that shareholders would only rarely use the power to oust through
retention elections. Thus, though the proposed CEO retention elections
would give shareholders a way to remove some of these underperformers,
it is unlikely they would exercise this option very often. Absent rare cases
of particularly slipshod performances, CEOs and other executives who
might be subject to retention elections can expect to be returned to office.
The peace of mind associated with the high probability that they will be
returned to office will likely translate into wide latitude to make tough
decisions.
Incidentally, also, other design features along the model of judicial
retention elections could also be used in the private sphere in order to
ensure CEOs’ ability to remain independent and comfortable enough to
make tough decisions. Recall that another design feature of judicial
retention elections was their infrequency. The infrequency of the elections
insulates judges from the risk of distraction associated with the prospect of
an imminent vote for removal.175 Similarly, CEO retention elections should
http://www.stanford.edu/~djenter/CEO_Turnover_and_RPE_August_2010.pdf (finding 383 forced
departures across 16,865 firm-year observations). See generally Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv
Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 283, 299 (2005) (noting
that “even though the incidence of executive firing increased a bit, the risk of being fired remained
quite small, hardly one that needs to be made up by a sharp increase in pay”).
173. See Steven N. Kaplan & Bernadette A. Minton, How Has CEO Turnover Changed?, 12
INT’L REV. FIN. 57, 57 (2012) (reporting that annual CEO turnover was 15.8% from 1992 to 2007,
which suggests an average tenure as CEO of less than seven years).
174. Hall & Aspin, supra note 120, at 343–44 (reporting that only twenty-two judges were
defeated in 1,864 retention elections). By contrast, in partisan contested elections, judges are turned
out more often, sometimes regularly turned out. See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 22, at 628 (noting
that in more recent partisan elections, incumbents lost approximately forty-five percent of the time);
Stith & Root, supra note 117, at 722 (noting that only twice were Missouri Supreme Court justices
returned to office in the two decades between 1920 and 1940).
175. See Shepherd, supra note 22, at 634 (noting that long judicial terms are meant to “reduce
any dangers of excessive popular influence”).
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only be held infrequently. For instance, retention elections might be crafted
to only occur from time to time after a triggering event, similar to how firm
special meetings are already structured. Generally, a larger shareholder or
group of shareholders (e.g., greater than ten percent) or the board of
directors may call a special meeting.176 By holding these votes
infrequently, CEOs (and other firm leaders who are subject to retention)
would have more leeway to make tough decisions, without the constant
worry about the prospect of a potentially career-ending vote. In sum,
retention votes offer at least two considerable benefits to independence. On
the one hand, retention elections for the most part preserve independence,
as most executives would have little to fear in terms of ouster. On the other
hand, a move to retention elections would not upend the normal dynamics
of corporate governance or the power of the board, since the board retains
the power to make appointments.
3. Accountability
Another advantage of this reform is that retention elections create some
level of accountability. As mentioned, it is likely that retention elections
will rarely result in an ouster of executives. Yet the presence of retention
elections still creates a check on CEO misconduct.
Recall that very few judges have been thrown out in retention elections.
Given the low rates of turnover for CEOs in corporate firms, it is also
unlikely that retention elections will result in much turnover. However, the
turnover that does occur might increase firm value. Similarly, in a previous
study, Professor David Ikenberry and Professor Josef Lakonishok found
that turnover in firm leadership after a proxy contest reduced declines to
firm value.177 In another study, Professor Michael S. Weisbach found
positive stock market reaction to announced CEO resignations.178 Though
it is largely an empirical question that goes beyond the scope of this
Article, it stands to reason that the threat of turnover of other firm leaders
through retention votes might also translate into firm improvements.
Further, like with judicial retention elections, the circumstances
surrounding an ouster are likely to be powerfully vivid in the minds of
176. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 7.02 (2012) (setting out requirement for special meetings).
177. It is worth noting that dissident victory after a proxy contest does not automatically lead
to improvements in firm value. In fact, in some cases, dissident victory may presage negative
returns. However, previous scholarship has noted that dissident victory, along with management
turnover, improves dissident prospects for success. For instance, in some of these cases, the
dissidents are able to markedly reduce the negative returns that can sometimes be associated with
dissident victory. See David Ikenberry & Josef Lakonishok, Corporate Governance Through the
Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications, 66 J. BUS. 405, 424 (1993) (finding that dissident
victories in proxy contests, in combination with management turnover, reduces the negative
abnormal return normally associated with dissident victory).
178. See Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431,
456–57 (1988) (finding positive excess returns surrounding announcements of CEO resignations).
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CEOs, particularly since both judges and CEOs value reputation. In fact,
the circumstances of an ouster might be even more vivid in the case of
CEOs.179 For background, consider that cash incentives are not the only
thing that makes being a CEO a desirable occupation. There is also prestige
that flows from running a large company. CEOs, for instance, get to play a
significant role in hiring others as top-level executives, serve as prominent
members of the local community, and serve as important figures in the
industry.180 In fact, for some (although admittedly not all), the prestige of
running a public company may be the most important motivation, even
more important than the money.
Retention elections create accountability because they interact with
prestige and reputation. A failure to be retained harms an executive’s
reputation. As mentioned, CEOs are rarely terminated and, even when they
are fired, CEOs are able to preserve their public reputation. When CEOs
are terminated, they are often allowed to gracefully exit the firm.181 They
are almost always given a seat on the board of directors182 and a large
severance package,183 and the departure is referred to as a “retirement.”184
As such, dismissed CEOs preserve their reputation and may be able to find
jobs elsewhere in the industry. Since public firings happen so rarely, a
failure to win a retention vote can have new consequences. A failure to
retain does not simply mean that the CEO loses one job—it may ruin
reputation and mean that the CEO has to exit the industry altogether. Thus,
another benefit of a retrospective response is that CEO retention elections
create a way for shareholders to tap into the non-cash (reputational)
incentives of leading a large U.S. public company. Thus, one would expect
that presence of voting will have some positive incentive effects. CEOs
and other executives subject to a vote will want to avoid public
179. By comparison, one commentator has said corporate directors are “the most reputationally
sensitive people in the world.” David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1811, 1812 (2001) (quoting Interview with Nell Minow, Editor, The Corporate Library, in
Washington D.C. (Oct. 25, 2000)).
180. See Posner, supra note 1, at 1021 (noting briefly that power can serve as “a source of
nonpecuniary income”); id. at 1031 (discussing non-cash benefits of being an American CEO).
181. See Jenter & Kanaan, supra note 172, at 10 (noting that “CEOs are rarely openly fired
from their positions,” which means that any study of CEO departures must be extremely careful);
Weisbach, supra note 178, at 437–38 (finding that in only nine of 286 cases of “resignations” was
performance mentioned as a reason, and noting that firms conceal the real reasons for CEO
terminations).
182. See Jensen & Murphy, supra note 170, at 240 (reporting that the vast majority of exiting
CEOs, eighty percent, remain on the board of directors and more than a third serve as chairman of
the board).
183. See Posner, supra note 1, at 1027 (discussing severance payments); see also Bebchuk et
al., supra note 18, at 760, 834–35 (noting payout related to acquisition transactions and discussing
gratuitous payments to executives for facilitating acquisition transactions).
184. See Weisbach, supra note 178, at 439 (finding that a significant share of CEO changes
are, allegedly, for retirement, while only a handful of changes are for performance-related reasons).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

35

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2013], Art. 3

1788

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

embarrassment, even if the chances of that event are slim.
Incidentally, retention votes seem especially suited for informed voting,
an important feature of accountability. In the judicial context, turnout in
retention elections is lower than for other electoral contests.185 The lower
turnout is usually associated with more informed voting, as uninformed
voters are more likely to avoid voting, particularly on down-ballot races.
Also, because judges run unopposed in retention elections, it means that
judges need not worry too much about uninformed voting for a seriously
unqualified candidate, a possibility that exists only when there is an
alternative on the ballot. Furthermore, it is likely that the design features of
retention elections help voters focus on substantive criteria when they cast
their vote. In judicial retention elections, judicial candidates are typically
prohibited from campaigning.186 In this way, voters likely make up their
mind whether the judge has performed satisfactorily, not on the basis of
whether the judge has a sufficient number of campaign commercials or
other irrelevant variables.187
III. OTHER BENEFITS OF AN EX POST APPROACH TO
ACCOUNTABILITY
CEO retention elections are a good response to the deep disadvantages
associated with trying to put a value on CEO performance before CEO
performance can be observed. For instance, recall advisory voting. With
advisory voting, shareholders make a reasonable guess about something
that they have not had an opportunity to observe—the CEO’s performance
at the relevant firm.188 Thus, advisory votes are mistimed. Shareholders are
asked to vote on expected performance, rather actual performance. As a
consequence, one might expect a relatively high error rate associated with
this style of reform. Shareholders will often approve high compensation
packages based on an expected performance that turns out to be subpar. On
the other hand, shareholders might reject a compensation scheme when the
CEO’s performance turns out to merit it. By contrast, CEO retention votes
capture the right moment in time. CEO retention votes would come after
shareholders have had a chance to evaluate and weigh CEO performance.
Shareholders will have ready facts to make this determination. It is
reasonable to intuit that the likelihood of error would be lower. After all,
with retention elections, shareholders are not asked to predict the future.
A. Political Appeal
Another potential advantage of retention elections relates to their
185. See Hall & Aspin, supra note 120, at 344 tbl.2 (noting the low turnout rates).
186. Kang & Shepherd, supra note 118, at 94 (citing Alfini & Brooks, supra note 139, at 684–
85).
187. Id. at 87 (noting the importance of campaign commercials on election results in
competitive (non-retention) judicial elections).
188. See Myers, supra note 108, at 449 (noting timing issues in advisory voting).
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political appeal. On the face of the matter, retention elections for judicial
candidates were created precisely because they gave voters what they
wanted—a role to play in judicial selection.189 Similarly, the prospect of
voting in retention elections is likely to be popular as these elections give
shareholders a role in CEO selection.
Furthermore, a retention election scheme matches up well with the
kinds of reforms already popular among some shareholders. Consider for
instance the most recent changes to director elections such as the shift to
majority-voting rules.190 The vast majority of directors run opposed. In
fact, in a previous study, the author reported that out of thousands of
director elections each year, directors faced opposition in about three dozen
contests.191 Because they run unopposed, at many firms the directors are
reelected regardless of whether most shareholders are satisfied with their
performance and regardless of how many votes are cast for the director.
This is a consequence of plurality voting, which is the traditional voting
scheme at most firms.192 Under plurality voting, a director who runs
unopposed is reelected when at least one vote is cast for that director.193
Thus, even if the vast majority of votes are cast “no,” a director is reelected
with a single vote.194 In a technical sense, the director received more votes
than any other candidate—after all, there was no other candidate.
However, firms are increasingly updating their voting schemes to
provide that directors that fail to receive a majority of the votes cast should
offer their resignation. The move toward majority-voting rules for director
elections has been something of a cause célèbre for shareholders, some
states, and progressive corporate law observers.195 At these firms, directors
still run unopposed. However, if a majority of shares are cast “no,” then the
director agrees to resign. At these firms, therefore, director elections have
189. See, e.g., Shepherd, supra note 22, at 681 (noting briefly the political appeal of an
accountability model that features elections of judges).
190. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of
Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 463 (2007) (examining majority-voting rules at 371 public
companies); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Too Many Notes and Not Enough Votes: Lucian Bebchuk
and Emperor Joseph II Kvetch About Contested Director Elections and Mozart’s Seraglio, 93 VA.
L. REV. 759, 765 n.21 (2007) (describing voting rules).
191. Lee Harris, Missing in Activism: Retail Investor Absence in Corporate Elections, 2010
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 104, 120–21 (reporting the overall number of challenges over a ten-year
period from 1999–2008).
192. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (West 2013) (providing that “[d]irectors shall
be elected by a plurality of the votes”).
193. See Thompson & Edelman, supra note 21, at 138 n.31 (discussing the default rule of
plurality voting); see also Harris, Shareholder Voting, supra note 25, at 1763 n.5 (explaining
plurality voting).
194. See Harris, supra note 191, at 140–41 n.117.
195. See Thompson & Edelman, supra note 21, at 138 n.31 (noting that firms are under
“sustained pressure from institutional shareholders” to adopt majority voting rules); see also Lisa
M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 61–70
(2008).
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become, for all practical purposes, retention elections. Directors run
unopposed and, if a majority of votes are not cast for the director, the
director’s relationship with the firm ends. This is exactly what is
anticipated with retention elections—firm leaders would run unopposed
and have to garner a majority of votes cast in order to be retained. Again,
changes along a similar track with director elections have been relatively
popular among shareholders and increasingly popular among firm boards.
Thus, inferring from what we see in director elections, a functionally
equivalent scheme for executives and high-ranking managers might be
well-positioned to generate support among firm stakeholders.
B. Practical Appeal
A second benefit of retention elections relates to their practical appeal.
For one thing, implementing retention elections does not require
complicated rulemaking like the rules associated with other forms of
shareholder voting. Recall that in judicial retention elections, the
candidates are not permitted to campaign for votes. Judge candidates can
neither raise money from outside interests nor spend their own. They make
no appeals to voters through television, radio, or any pitch whatsoever.
This means that retention elections are low-key affairs. The system is easy
to organize and eliminates the need for the usual campaign-related rules
surrounding fundraising, solicitations, and disputes that invariably arise
over whether such rules were followed. For instance, in judicial retention
elections, since there is no fundraising, candidates need not worry about
donation limits and regulators need not worry about the content of
campaign advertisements. In the corporate sphere, this aspect of retention
elections would mean that an elaborate apparatus to regulate the campaign
process would be unnecessary. As it stands now in the corporate sphere,
director elections have led to a raft of complicated “solicitation” rules.
Candidates for director seats, for example, cannot attempt to influence the
shareholder vote without filing a complicated, lengthy disclosure document
and following other strict solicitation rules. However, the intricate rules
related to the soliciting of shareholder votes would seem unnecessary with
retention elections.
Additionally, because retention elections do not depend on an opponent,
the scheme is far less complicated than other frequently touted reforms
designed to hold firm leaders accountable to shareholders, such as socalled proxy access. Proxy access is perhaps the most often debated reform
for ensuring that shareholders have a way to hold firm leaders
accountable.196 Through proxy access, firms would help facilitate
196. See, e.g., Cynthia J. Campbell et al., Current Perspectives on Shareholder Proposals:
Lessons from the 1997 Proxy Season, 28 FIN. MGMT. 89, 90 (1999) (noting that the SEC received a
large number of public comment letters in response to proposed rule changes related to proxy
access); Joseph A. Grundfest, The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and
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shareholder nominations to the board of directors. When the ballots or
proxy cards are sent to those eligible to vote in director elections, firms
would be required to include shareholders’ nominees to the board
alongside the incumbent nominees. If shareholders are able to make
nominations to the board using the firm’s proxy, they will be able to run
shareholder challengers for board seats at little cost.
Yet, for proxy access to be successful, disenchanted shareholders have
to find a challenger to run against the current slate of directors. This task is
challenging. Many shareholders, particularly institutional shareholders,
which represent the lion’s share of the shareholder community, want to
have a voice in firm operations, but want to stay relatively passive.197 In
proxy contests, as it turns out, these shareholders are willing to vote “no”
against directors that they have not measured up, but they are unwilling to
field their own nominees for board seats.198 In fact, proxy access may be
too blunt of an instrument for other reasons as well. If the status quo
persists, the only way shareholders could accomplish the ouster of the CEO
is by launching a contest to replace the board of directors and hoping that a
newly installed board replaces the CEO. However, shareholders may not be
inclined to call for the ouster of the board of directors. Shareholders may
view the real problem as the CEO. Retention elections give them a conduit
to make this change. Thus, retention elections create a more targeted
solution than the current reform ideas, like proxy access. Because retention
elections do not depend on shareholders fielding an opponent and taking an
active role in firm operations or seeking the ouster of the board, retention
elections are simpler. Retention elections sync well with the more passive
role many shareholders want to play. Shareholders dissatisfied with the
firm leadership need only vote “no” in corporate governance. They need
not also launch a daunting proxy challenge.199
Finally, in some regards retention elections are better suited to
accountability than schemes hinged to executive compensation such as
advisory voting. When it comes to advisory voting, some shareholders use
the Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361, 386 (2010) (same); see also Harris, Shareholder Voting, supra note 25,
at 1803–07 (summarizing the debate over proxy access).
197. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833, 876 n.91 (2005) (noting the disinclination of some investors to get involved with
activism); see also Harris, Shareholder Campaign Funds, supra note 25, at 201 (discussing the
passiveness of some institutional investors).
198. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 691
(2007) (remarking that “[r]unning a contest that demands . . . time and attention . . . does not sit
well [with some investors]”).
199. Incidentally, retention elections might sidestep the need for proxy access in the first place.
That is, through retention elections, shareholders may have less desire to nominate alternatives to
the board of directors. They might be content to rest on their ability to vote to recall poorperforming executives. Thus, retention elections relieve some of the pressure to push for proxy
access.
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those votes as an opportunity to vent frustration rather than assess
performance. That is, some shareholder voters will use an advisory vote as
a way to vent their frustration with high executive salaries, the politics du
jour, without giving fair appreciation to managerial performance or the
scarcity of managerial talent.200 In other words, many will disapprove of
high executive compensation, regardless of performance. They may do it
because they believe high executive pay to be inequitable or unAmerican.201
However, with retention elections, shareholders might be more likely to
turn their attention to performance issues. They are less likely to vote based
on the politics of the moment, as with advisory voting. In a retention
election, voters will not face the politically loaded issues of considering the
appropriateness of a compensation schedule. From the perspective of some
small segment of the shareholder population, the CEO’s salary is always
objectionable. Thus, these votes are disconnected from the CEO’s
performance. By contrast, with retention elections, shareholders will be
asked to consider whether the executive is a good choice. To be sure, it is
possible that some level of voters will still use this as an opportunity to be
contrarian and vent frustration. Yet, the reframing of the question to target
whether the CEO should remain in office likely trains the attention of the
voter on the CEO’s performance, rather than force more ideologically
loaded questions regarding whether the CEO is too wealthy.
It is worth mentioning also that retention elections are flexible enough
to deal with the unique circumstances of individual firms. Importantly, this
reform proposes that firms be required to give shareholders a vote on
whether the CEO is retained, but firms, at their discretion, can do
significantly more using the same model. Firms might expand retention
200. See Posner, supra note 1, at 1015 (noting two ways to define excessive compensation, but
dismissing the concept of a just reward, “a concept that might be based for example on notions of
an acceptable ratio between the compensation of the highest-paid and lowest-paid worker in an
organization”). In fact, the unfairness rationale, not necessarily performance, has been the cause
célèbre of many elected officials. For instance, President Obama, without making a qualification
regarding performance, called Wall Street bonuses “shameful.” Aaron Lucchetti & Matthew
Karnitschnig, On Street, New Reality on Pay Sets In, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2009),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123336341862935387.html; see also Kenneth R. Bazinet et al.,
President Obama Caps Executive Compensation Limits at $500K for Firms Receiving Bailout
Funds, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 4, 2009), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/presidentobama-caps-executive-compensation-limits-500k-firms-receiving-bailout-funds-article-1.388379
(reporting that on the topic of executive compensation, President Obama was the “shamer in
chief”); Thomas McCarroll, Executive Pay, TIME (June 24, 2001), http://www.time.com/time/maga
zine/article/0,9171,159544,00.html (calling executive compensation reform “a populist issue that no
politician can resist”).
201. See Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. ECON. PERSP.
49, 63 (2003) (reporting that the average CEO of an S&P 500 firm made about thirty times the pay
of the average production worker in 1970, but made about 360 times the pay of the average
production worker by 2002).
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elections to include other leaders and executive officers at the firm, like the
CFO or general counsel. For instance, when tax code reforms, previously
discussed, were implemented, the reforms referred to the firm’s top five
highest paid executives.202 Similarly, some firms might expand retention
votes to include other officers and high-ranking executives of the firm, not
just the firm’s CEO. Incidentally, firms may also amplify the penalties
associated with retention votes. It is easy to imagine, for instance, that a
retention vote to oust a CEO (or other leader) can be categorized as
terminations “for cause.” If a failure of a retention vote was classified as
for-cause termination, it would give some firms a legal basis for avoiding
paying the departing CEO (or other executive) expensive severance
payments, golden parachutes, and other exit benefits.
IV. ALTERNATIVE EX POST APPROACHES TO ACCOUNTABILITY
Retention elections are not the only way to create ex post accountability
for CEOs and other executives. In fact, there are already other mechanisms
that hold CEOs and other executives accountable for misconduct.
Executives at firms are held in check by already existing internal and
external monitoring mechanisms, some of these to be considered in this
Part. As for internal controls, the board of directors already has the power
to remove ineffective officers like the firm’s CEO. Shareholders also have
indirect powers to influence executive conduct. Shareholders can vote for
members of the board of directors and they can also file suit. Also, in
theory, takeover markets serve as a check on CEO misconduct. That is,
firms that are mismanaged become ripe for a takeover attempt and give rise
to the specter that new owners will come in with plans to sack the
underperforming managers. However, each of these existing checks on
managerial abuse is ineffective, as discussed in more detail below.
A. Internal Accountability
The board of directors is one of the internal methods of checking CEO
performance after misconduct has occurred.
1. Board of Directors
If the board acts as expected, additional corporate governance reforms
are unnecessary and boards of directors would hold executives
accountable.203 If, based on observed performance, the CEO is paid too
much, the board of directors would reduce compensation. Shareholders
202. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(3)(A)–(B) (2012) (applying the excessive remuneration provision
to the “chief executive officer” and “the 4 highest compensated officers for the taxable year (other
than the chief executive officer)”).
203. See Weisbach, supra note 178, at 431 (describing boards as internal monitors of
managers, at least in theory).
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would not need an opportunity to “advise” on compensation packages or
even vote on retention. More to the point, the board of directors might
simply fire a CEO who underperforms relative to his or her peer group.204
If boards of directors could be expected to live up to their responsibility,
there would be little need for any reform.
In fact, the data suggests that, over time, the board of directors have all
the features of an increasingly effective monitoring body.205 First, the
boards of directors of public companies have become smaller, and smaller
boards tend to be more effective.206 Median board size has decreased from
fourteen in the late 1980s to twelve by the 1990s.207 Second, boards have
become increasingly populated by outsiders.208 Again, this feature of board
structure seems to also be correlated positively with the board’s monitoring
ability.209 As the number of outside directors on the board increases, the
204. See Jenter & Kanaan, supra note 172, at 1–2 (discussing the predominant theoretical
models on the CEO dismissal decision and stating that “[i]f the board’s assessment of CEO quality
falls below some threshold, often equal to the expected quality of a replacement, then the board
dismisses the CEO”).
205. See Hall & Murphy, supra note 201, at 65 (“Although corporate governance can surely
improve further, changes over the last decade have strengthened board governance and seem
inconsistent with an increased ability of executives to extract rents from captive boards.”).
206. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 77 (discussing previous research finding that larger
boards are less effective); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 233, 247 tbl.4 (2002)
(reporting findings that show a negative relationship between board size and several firm’s
performance measures); Hall & Murphy, supra note 201, at 65; see also Michael C. Jensen, The
Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831,
865 (1993) (arguing that smaller boards are effective at monitoring the CEO); David Yermack,
Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185, 189
(1996) (arguing that board size significantly impacts firm performance).
207. See Huson et al., supra note 17, at 2276–77 (noting that in their sample mean board size
decreased over time).
208. Id. at 2277 (finding, over time, a significant increase in the number of outside directors on
boards); see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 18, at 773 (noting the trend among firms to increase the
number of outside directors); Bhagat & Black, supra note 206, at 238–39 (noting that in the last
forty years, boards have transitioned from majority outsiders to majority insiders); Hall & Murphy,
supra note 201, at 65 (noting that in modern corporations, as distinguished from earlier years, the
compensation committee is typically composed of outside directors); Weisbach, supra note 178, at
456–58 (finding that outside boards are more successful at improving firm value after a CEO
turnover event than boards dominated by insiders, particularly in cases where firm performance has
previously been poor).
209. See Huson et al., supra note 17, at 2267 (noting previous literature on inside versus
outside directors). But see Bhagat & Black, supra note 206, at 247–48 (reporting that board
independence shows no relationship to positive firm performance and hinting that board
independence might undermine firm performance); see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (suggesting that independent boards are better boards); Posner,
supra note 1, at 1024 (noting that “there is no persuasive evidence that corporate performance is
positively correlated with the percentage of independent directors on the corporation’s board”);
Weisbach, supra note 178, at 431 (noting that outside directors are “widely believed to play a larger
role in monitoring management than inside board members”).
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board’s ability to monitor CEO actions also increases.210 For instance,
previous commentators have theorized that inside directors are less likely
to discipline a CEO for poor performance, since they may owe their careers
to the CEO.211 Others have theorized that outside directors have a
reputational interest in being good monitors.212 Thus, they use board
positions as a way to signal to the marketplace that they are tough-minded,
no-nonsense directors.213 According to some empirical evidence, outsiders
have been more willing to terminate a CEO for poor performance.214 They
are also more apt to select an outside CEO as a replacement candidate,
which, according to some studies over outside versus inside appointments,
has positive firm value effects.215
Third, changes in the way members of the board are compensated to
mimic the structure of pay for top executives also, theoretically, could give
the board new reason to amplify their monitoring.216 Some boards have
turned to stock-based compensation for directors.217 The thought is that the
210. See Weisbach, supra note 178, at 432 (reporting that firms with “outsider-dominated”
boards are more likely to remove CEOs for poor performance as measured by stock returns and
earnings). But see Bhagat & Black, supra note 206, at 233 (arguing that the empirical evidence does
not support the proposition that independent boards improve corporate performance).
211. See Huson et al., supra note 17, at 2267 (noting previous literature on inside versus
outside directors).
212. See Weisbach, supra note 178, at 433 (theorizing that insiders are unwilling to discipline
managers because of their own career interests).
213. See Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L.
& ECON. 301, 315 (1983) (discussing the theory that outside directors use their positions to
cultivate reputations as experts in decision making).
214. See Weisbach, supra note 178, at 433 (noting that “outside directors are generally
respected leaders from the business or academic community whose reputations suffer when they are
directors of faltering companies”); see also Kenneth A. Borokhovich et al., Outside Directors and
CEO Selection, 31 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 337, 337 (1996) (reporting that outside
directors are more likely to select a replacement CEO from outside of the firm).
215. Mark R. Huson et al., Managerial Succession and Firm Performance, 74 J. FIN. ECON.
237, 258 (2004) (finding that outside CEO appointments lead to increases in expected firm value).
But see Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 75 (noting that CEOs selected from outside are also
prone to attempt to influence the board to put in place lavish executive compensation structures);
Bhagat & Black, supra note 206, at 264 (noting several ways inside directors might add firm value).
216. See Huson et al., supra note 17, at 2268 (summarizing studies finding that stock option
grants to directors have increased substantially over time); id. at 2276–77 (reporting that in a
sample of 1,316 firms the stock-based compensation for directors likely increased over time); see
also Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 77 (noting that director shareholding is related to reductions
in executive compensation, a sign of enhanced monitoring by the board).
217. See, e.g., Bhagat & Black, supra note 206, at 261 (reporting findings that show a hint that
“stock ownership by outside directors correlates with improved performance”); Tod Perry, Incentive
Compensation for Outside Directors and CEO Turnover 17 (July 1999) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=236033 (finding that “[f]irms with
independent directors receiving incentive compensation are more likely to remove a CEO following
poor performance than firms that do not have independent boards and do not compensate directors
with incentive-based pay”). But see Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 74 (suggesting that boards of
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use of stock-based compensation, which creates a stake in the firm for
directors, tends to give directors an incentive to be better monitors.218
Some data suggests that the changes in corporate governance structures
might be working. For instance, studies have found that the percentage of
CEO turnovers that are terminations has increased over time.219 Further,
boards of directors more frequently appoint an outsider as CEO in these
cases, which, as mentioned, can have positive value effects.220
However, though some of the features of corporate governance have
improved over time, boards of directors are frequently poor monitors of
executive conduct.221 Directors want to maintain their positions of power
and influence. The best strategy for doing that is to play to the CEO’s
favor.222 For instance, the failures of the board are only amplified in the
executive compensation setting. When setting CEO pay, many firms rely
on a compensation committee comprised of independent directors.223
However, as persuasively argued by Professor Bebchuk, Professor Fried,
and Professor Walker, the CEO has substantial sway over the process and
the ultimate outcome.224 The CEO can influence who is appointed to the
board of directors.225 Since appointment to the board of directors is
relatively lucrative and prestigious, smart members of the board might be
happy to ratify a sky-high executive compensation package and keep the

directors are ineffective monitors because directors have too little tied up in the success of the firm);
Weisbach, supra note 178, at 451–52 (finding little evidence that stock ownership of board
members has a significant effect on the level of monitoring).
218. See Huson et al., supra note 17, at 2268 (noting that incentive compensation for board
members may be related to increased monitoring of firm CEOs).
219. Id. at 2278 (noting that forced turnover has increased monotonically across sampled time
periods).
220. Id. (finding that, over time, boards have been more likely to appoint an outsider as CEO).
221. See Simmons, supra note 1, at 315–16 (noting CEO pressure and influence on the board);
see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 18, at 766 (summarizing the core problems with director
oversight of firm leaders); id. at 754 (arguing that boards of directors are ineffective and, as a
consequence, executive compensation has reached excessive levels).
222. BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 25 (noting that director positions are well-paid and
offer several nonfinancial benefits that “give directors a strong interest in keeping their positions”).
223. In fact, listing standards often require it. See, e.g., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL
§ 303A.05(a) (2009), available at http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selected
node=chp_1_4_3_8&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm-sections%2F (providing that “[l]isted
companies must have a compensation committee composed entirely of independent directors”).
224. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 4–5 (arguing that top executives have substantial
influence and can use their power to obtain “rents”); Bebchuk et al., supra note 18, at 766–67;
Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 74 (“Because the CEO’s influence over the board gives her
significant influence over the nomination process, directors have an incentive to ‘go along’ with the
CEO’s pay arrangement, a matter dear to the CEO’s heart—at least as long as the compensation
package remains within the range of what can plausibly be defended and justified.”).
225. See Myers, supra note 108, at 425–26 (describing the multitude of ways CEOs can
influence directors).
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CEO happy with them.226 In fact, since the CEO influences who is
appointed to the compensation committee, members of the compensation
committee may want to sidestep confrontation with the CEO (not to
mention other board members).227 And the compensation committee has
little financial incentive to negotiate vigorously over CEO pay.228
Furthermore, members of the board of directors use one post to angle
for another position on another board of directors. If directors take a stand
against their CEO, they may anger their current “golden goose” and, as the
information gets out, alienate other prospective CEOs looking for pliant
director candidates.229 Finally, some have argued that directors have little
financial stake in the firm in the first place, which also may make them
apathetic about CEO performance.230 As a consequence, the monitoring
features of the relationship—largely pay setting and termination—may not
be as effective as perceived.
Finally, even if boards did not have these conflicts, some evidence
suggests that the board of directors, a group usually comprised of experts
on corporate governance, law, and firm operations, may not have the
capacity to determine executive pay levels.231 For one thing, boards of
directors have little to no staff resources.232 When it comes to setting
executive compensation levels, the board of directors relies on the advice
of experts retained for that purpose. The board has to hire executive
compensation consultants to figure out appropriate levels, and attorneys to
draft appropriate contracts. However, the executive compensation
“experts” may be of little help.233 Compensation consultants push for sky226. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 73 (noting that directors want to be reappointed
because of pay and prestige and, thus, “have an incentive to favor the CEO”); see also Bebchuk et
al., supra note 18, at 766–67, 770 (noting that the CEO dominates the director appointment process
and the economic costs directors face in challenging a CEO).
227. See Posner, supra note 1, at 1024 (describing CEO “back scratching” or trading favors
with compensation consultants and board members).
228. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 18, at 766–74 (discussing the failures of compensation
committees).
229. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 74 (arguing that a “go along” style may create
opportunities for directors to join other boards); see also Bebchuk et al., supra note 18, at 770–71
(noting the reputational consequence of challenging a CEO).
230. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 74 (suggesting that boards are ineffective monitors
because directors have little tied up in the firm); Myers, supra note 108, at 426 (“Typical directors
have minimal company holdings, so they suffer little financial penalty if the CEO’s compensation
arrangement does not lead to optimal results for the corporation.”).
231. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 74 (noting that boards may be ineffective monitors
because they do not have “easy access to independent information and advice on compensation
practices necessary to effectively challenge the CEO’s pay”); Thomas & Martin, supra note 1, at
1033 (noting that “[e]ven directors on the compensation committee, with access to expert
consultants and all of the facts surrounding these plans, may have difficulty understanding them”).
232. See Posner, supra note 1, at 1020.
233. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 78 (arguing that consultants do not help with
reaching optimal pay); Simmons, supra note 1, at 352–53 (noting some of the failures of

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

45

Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 6 [2013], Art. 3

1798

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65

high pay, face conflicts of their own,234 and frequently get the levels
completely wrong.235 If boards of directors—and sometimes the experts
they hire—are not in a position to make educated, unaided decisions about
levels of executive compensation, it is not clear why reform advocates
would imagine that shareholders are in a position to do so.
2. Shareholders
Shareholders also serve as a check on CEO underperformance. As
mentioned, shareholders have at least two powers—the right to vote and
the right to sue—that may serve as a check on CEO abuse. Shareholders
can hold in check excessive compensation and managerial performance
through shareholder voting. In fact, shareholders who control large blocks
of shares are particularly able to play a role in checking managerial
abuses.236 Over time, evidence suggests that block holding by institutional
shareholders has increased significantly.237 In one study, researchers found
that institutional ownership grew from an average of 35.8% between 1977
and 1982 to 51.75% between 1989 and 1994.238 Today, institutions control
more than sixty percent of the stock of public companies.239
However, shareholder ability to ensure adequate performance through
voting is severely limited.240 First, shareholder voting is indirect. It affects
directors who, in turn, select the CEO and other high-ranking officers.241
Second, shareholder voting, as the system is currently designed, means that
compensation consultants).
234. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 18, at 772 (noting that compensation consultants are
incentivized to push for higher compensation to remain in favor with the managers who selected
them).
235. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 78–79 (arguing that consultants camouflage
excessive rents and suboptimal contracts with managers); Myers, supra note 108, at 435–36 (noting
studies have shown that “the use of consultants is associated with higher measures of excess CEO
pay”); Posner, supra note 1, at 1024–25 (noting why compensation consultants fail to effectively
check CEO compensation); see also In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275,
280–81 (Del. Ch. 2003) (discussing the failure of a compensation consultant to place value on
severance payments to a top executive).
236. See Huson et al., supra note 17, at 2269 (associating the growth in institutional share
ownership with activism at firms); see also David J. Denis & Diane K. Denis, Performance
Changes Following Top Management Dismissals, 50 J. FIN. 1029, 1036 (1995) (noting that large
block holder shareholders may create significant pressure for CEO turnover).
237. See Huson et al., supra note 17, at 2269–70 (describing the rise in institutional
ownership).
238. Id. at 2277.
239. SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, FACT BOOK 2011, 65 (Charles Bartlett, Jr. ed., 2011).
240. See Heard, supra note 8, at 758 (discussing why voting is an ineffective “limited
weapon”).
241. But see Thomas et al., supra note 20, at 1260 (noting that one shareholder advisory firm,
Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc., suggested that shareholder voting on executive
compensation might be more effective than voting to oust directors).
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directors are rarely seriously threatened to lose their board seats.242 As
Richard Posner put it, shareholder voting for directors “resembles the
system of voting in the Soviet Union and other totalitarian nations.”243
Third, though institutional ownership has grown, because of the sheer size
of public companies in terms of capitalization, there are very few large
(e.g., just over five percent) holders in public companies.244 The vast
majority of corporations do not have a controlling shareholder to hold
managerial abuses in check.245 This makes it difficult to rely on a large
shareholder to fill the monitoring role.246 Finally, shareholder lawsuits
might also be a way to check managerial abuse. However, in the corporate
context, the lawsuit is an ineffective way of curbing the growth in CEO
compensation or checking managerial abuse.247 Courts have routinely
relied on the “business judgment rule,” which effectively gives the board of
directors the power to set salaries without little practical oversight. There
are exceptions to the business judgment rule, like waste and irrational
decision making, but courts have been loath to permit shareholders to go
forward with suits that question the board’s authority to make
compensation decisions.248
B. External Accountability
Furthermore, external market forces may serve as a sort of ex post
check on managerial misconduct.249 Consider, for instance, takeover
markets.250 Firms that have underperforming management will also
242. See Posner, supra note 1, at 1023 (noting that shareholders wield very little power when it
comes to director elections); see also Harris, supra note 190, at 120–21 (reporting that there are
very few challenges to board seats from year to year).
243. Posner, supra note 1, at 1023; see BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 25 (noting that
incumbent directors are virtually assured reelection and only in rare cases face any opposition).
244. See, e.g., Bhagat & Black, supra note 206, at 246 (reporting the number of larger
shareholders (5%) in a sample of public companies and finding that the median number of larger
shareholders was one).
245. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 18, at 761.
246. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 1, at 82–83 (noting previous studies that show the
influence that a large shareholder can have on firms).
247. See Core et al., supra note 1, at 1147 (discussing why shareholder suits are a weak
constraint on executive compensation).
248. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (refusing to
grant an exception to the business judgment rule when shareholders complained about a $130
million severance package); In re Tyson Foods, Inc., 919 A.2d 563, 591 (Del. Ch. 2007) (noting
that “[a] committee of independent directors enjoys the presumption that its actions are prima facie
protected by the business judgment rule”); see also Thomas & Martin, supra note 1, at 1031–32
(noting that external markets, such as “labor markets, the market for corporate control, capital
markets, and product markets” constrain misconduct).
249. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. &
ECON. 395, 414 n.48 (1983) (noting the disciplinary effect of takeover markets).
250. Takeover markets, of course, are not the only market force that could serve as a check on
CEO misconduct. The market for labor, capital, and products might also have an inhibiting effect on
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perform poorly in the marketplace. As the value of their shares
deteriorates, the firm becomes more appealing to takeover artists. The
incentives for takeover artists are sharp. In the minds of takeover artists,
these firms, at their depressed prices, represent good value. The takeover
artist can gain control of the firm on the cheap, replace the
underperforming managers, and turn a quick profit as the firm turns
around.251 In fact, the evidence suggests that this is exactly what takeover
artists do. For instance, according to studies, the turnover rate for
management shortly after a merger is nearly three times the usual turnover
rate.252
However, while there are exceptions, takeover markets are hardly a
broad-based method of responding to managerial misconduct.253
Specifically, whereas in the 1970s and 1980s when takeover markets were
relatively robust, takeover activity slowed considerably in the 1990s once
states began to take action and lawyers became craftier at staving off
takeover attempts.254 On the one hand, state legislators in most states have
passed anti-acquisition statutes that make takeovers more difficult.255
These share acquisition rules have made takeovers more complicated by
making shareholder votes in connection with an acquisition a requirement
CEO misbehavior. For a general discussion of each of these, see Bebchuk et al., supra note 18, at
774–79. The media also acts as an external constraint on managerial misconduct. The media can
report managerial misconduct, cultivate shareholder outrage, and raise the interest of regulators who
might pressure managers to improve their behavior. However, the media has no independent
conduit for holding managers accountable. Instead, the media is only effective if the board of
directors (with all its conflicts) or shareholders (whose powers are limited) are able to do something
about what is reported in the press. See Heard, supra note 8, at 765 (noting that the media has to
some extent galvanized reform); see also Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 75 (discussing mediadriven “outrage” as a constraint on managers); Alexander Dyck et al., The Corporate Governance
Role of the Media: Evidence from Russia, 63 J. FIN. 1093, 1095 (2008) (reporting findings that
news coverage by international newspapers led to course corrections at firms in Russia); Posner,
supra note 1, at 1029 (discussing the role of the media); id. at 1013 n.2 (listing news articles
discussing high-profile executive compensation issues).
251. See George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public
Corporation, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 881, 889 (1989) (explaining the high premiums associated with
takeovers as a function, in part, of “slack in target management”).
252. See, e.g., Jensen & Murphy, supra note 170, at 253 (discussing briefly turnover rates at
merged and unmerged firms).
253. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 74 (noting the inadequacy of the market for
corporate control); Posner, supra note 1, at 1029 (noting that competitive activity in the market is
not likely to weed out agency costs since the problem plagues all firms).
254. See Robert Comment & G. William Schwert, Poison or Placebo? Evidence on the
Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4 (1995)
(reporting decline in takeover activity); see also Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 74 (noting the
inadequacy of the market for corporate control as a check on CEO behavior); Huson et al., supra
note 17, at 2266 (noting the decline in disciplinary takeover activity).
255. See Guhan Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L.J.
621, 631–32 (2003) (noting that the majority of states have statutory protections against hostile
acquisitions, including share acquisition statutes).
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of state law. On the other hand, lawyers have been adept at crafting
antitakeover corporate governance provisions that insulate directors and
their appointed managers from the possibility of a takeover and
accompanying ouster.256 These include provisions such as elaborate poison
pills and staggered board elections.257 By simply staggering when board
elections occur, the incumbent board can delay a takeover attempt by a
year or two, during which time the takeover artist is likely to lose interest.
These antitakeover provisions probably insulate CEOs from the prospect of
a takeover and repercussions for their actions.258
Furthermore, even when the legal barriers to a takeover can be
surmounted, takeover markets frequently fail as broad monitoring devices.
Takeover artists frequently only seek out firms that are going to create very
significant returns.259 For instance, even one of the great proponents of the
disciplining effect of takeover markets, Frank Easterbrook, has conceded
that a takeover artist would only be interested if the returns are at least
twenty percent.260 This is a tall order and surely eliminates many firms with
subpar managers as potential takeover targets. Put differently, though
corporate leaders may be laggards, in the average case this will not make
them a good target for a takeover in an economic sense.
CONCLUSION
The go-to reform for executive misbehavior has become executive
compensation schemes of the pay-for-performance variety. These schemes
are straightforward. The threat of pay reduction (or prospect of increased
compensation) might incent CEOs to perform well. However, these
schemes are at most a second-best solution to the problem of CEO
accountability. The current reforms for managerial misbehavior elide the
central concern of most shareholders—ridding firms of underperforming
CEOs. Thus, private sphere experts who are concerned about executive
256. Grundfest, supra note 88, at 858 (“The takeover wars are over. Management won.
Although hostile tender offers remain technically possible . . . it will be difficult for hostile bidders
to prevail in takeover battles, even if shareholders support the insurgents’ efforts.”).
257. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1144 n.5, 1153–55 (Del.
1989) (discussing the firm’s defensive tactics); Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059,
1083 (Del. Ch. 1985), aff’d, 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (approving poison pill’s use);
Subramanian, supra note 254, at 625 (noting that the board may adopt a poison pill as a defensive
tactic “in a matter of hours if necessary”).
258. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 1, at 78 (noting that antitakeover provisions are
associated with “excess compensation” for managers).
259. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 18, at 777 (noting that takeover interest is only piqued by
the prospect of significant returns and “substantial performance shortfalls”).
260. Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers’ Discretion and Investors’ Welfare: Theories and
Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 567 (1984) (“There are few acquisitions today at premiums in the
1-20% range. This means that when combinations could produce benefits of 20% or less to
investors, they are unlikely to occur.”).
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performance ought to look in a new direction. One way to hold an
executive accountable is to give shareholders a vote on whether the
executive should be retained—not how much he or she should be paid.
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